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SUMMARY
Operations management studies the process of transforming material, labor,
energy, or ideas into goods or services. Operations strategy outlines how firms leverage
their capabilities to achieve competitive advantage. While developing or possessing
these capabilities is paramount, they must be successfully leveraged to yield com-
petitive advantage. This thesis comprises three essays which consider how firms can
successfully implement their operations strategy, specifically within the context of
supply chain management, remanufacturing, and project execution. The first essay
(Chapter 2) empirically investigates the performance benefits of operational slack and
operational scope in dynamic environments. We investigate how contingent invest-
ments in operational slack and operational scope moderate the relationship between
unstable and unpredictable markets on firm performance. The second essay (Chap-
ter 3) considers how a firm’s organizational structure and incentives influence its
decision to participate in remanufacturing. Through a principal-agent structure, we
determine the optimal sales agent commission structures and product portfolio of new
and remanufactured product for the firm. The third essay (Chapter 4) considers the
challenges of executing strategic initiatives. We recognize the dual role of performance
metrics, they communicate the target outcomes (i.e., what types of project outcomes
are sought), and at the same time they incentivize the organizational impetus (i.e.,
effort commitment) from the stakeholders. Using a game theoretic model, we investi-
gate the implications of the target outcome (focused or flexible definition of success)





Operations management studies the process of transforming material, labor, energy,
or ideas into goods or services. Operations strategy outlines how firms leverage their
capabilities to achieve competitive advantage. Such capabilities may consist of man-
ufacturing flexibility, operational slack, supply chain structure, production technol-
ogy, IT infrastructure, organizational structure and incentives, or business processes.
While developing or possessing these capabilities is paramount, they must be suc-
cessfully leveraged to yield competitive advantage. This thesis comprises three essays
which consider how firms can successfully implement their operations strategy, specif-
ically within the context of supply chain management, remanufacturing, and project
execution. The first essay empirically examines how operational slack and operational
scope influence firm performance. The second and third essays utilize normative mod-
els to investigate how different organizational structures and incentive plans influence
the implementation of strategic initiatives. The second specifically considers condi-
tions unique in the remanufacturing context, while the third investigates how senior
management’s definition of success influences project execution.
The first essay (Chapter 2) empirically investigates the performance benefits of op-
erational slack (measured as capacity slack, inventory slack, and supply chain slack)
and operational scope (measured as product scope, geographic scope, and process
scope) in dynamic environments, specifically investigating how operational initiatives
moderate the effects of dynamic markets on firm performance. We find that strate-
gic investments in inventory slack improve firm performance in unstable markets;
whereas investments in all three forms of operational slack improve firm performance
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in unpredictable markets. Further, we find support for lean operations (low oper-
ational slack) in stable markets and focused operations (low operational scope) in
predictable markets. Investments in operational slack (scope) are found to have no
performance benefits for firms in unpredictable (unstable) markets, indicating that
the choice of strategic operational investment should be contingent on the specific
market conditions of the firm.
The second essay (Chapter 3) considers how a firm’s organizational structure and
incentives influence their decision to participate in remanufacturing. We specifically
investigate the challenges of motivating sales agents to sell remanufactured products
that compete in the same market with their new product counterparts. Participation
in remanufactured product sales has generally been considered a profitable strategy
for firms, provided that the costs of remanufacturing are sufficiently low. This allows
for profitable market expansion to price conscious consumers. We find that when sales
agents can be utilized to increase sales, conditions exist where it may be optimal to
not sell remanufactured products, even if they yield higher profit margins than new
products. Additionally, we find that commissions for new products should be higher
than those for remanufactured products, which is due to the unique supply constraints
on remanufactured products.
The third essay (Chapter 4) considers the challenges of executing strategic ini-
tiatives. We recognize the dual role of performance metrics, they communicate the
target outcomes (i.e., what types of project outcomes are sought), and at the same
time they incentivize the organizational impetus (i.e., effort commitment) from the
stakeholders. Using a game theoretic model, we investigate the implications of the
target outcome (focused or flexible definition of success) and project uncertainty,
which are dependent on the organizational structure of the firm. Specifically, we con-
sider project execution in two archetypical organizational structures, functional and
project-based. Functional organizational structures foster skill expertise, but often
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suffer from cross-functional coordination challenges. Alternatively, project-based or-
ganizations utilize project managers to facilitate cross-functional coordination, but
suffer from the loss of stakeholder technical expertise. We find that for incremen-
tal projects (i.e., those with low uncertainty), flexible definitions of success should
be specified in functional organizations, while focused definitions should be speci-
fied in project-based organizations. Flexible targets provide a tolerance for failure to
the stakeholders and reduce the incentives required to ensure impetus in functional




FIRM PERFORMANCE IN DYNAMIC
ENVIRONMENTS: THE ROLE OF OPERATIONAL
SLACK AND OPERATIONAL SCOPE
2.1 Introduction
In order to remain successful in competitive markets, organizations must maintain a
stable operational core under environmental variation (Thompson, 1967). Examples
of exogenous variations include pricing and scheduling uncertainties with respect to
a firm’s upstream supply of materials or the downstream demand uncertainties for
a firm’s finished goods. These exogenous variations are reflected in the environmen-
tal dynamism of an industry, such that firms in more dynamic environments will
experience more variations than those in less dynamic environments. Firms can oper-
ationally manage such variations through two operational strategies: investing in op-
erational slack and/or broadening operational scope (Boyer & Leong, 1996; Ramdas,
2003). However, the findings on the effects of operational slack and operational scope
on performance remain mixed. In this study, we investigate whether two components
of environmental dynamism - unpredictability and instability - could help untangle
the mixed relationships between operational slack and operational scope with firm
performance. Our study aims to address the question: How do operational slack and
operational scope contingently affect firm performance in unpredictable and unstable
dynamic environments? Our empirical setting focuses on 964 publicly traded firms in
23 industries in the manufacturing sector from the years 1998 to 2007, representing
8,473 firm year observations.
Operational slack represents the resources available for the operational activities
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of a firm which are in excess of what is required to fulfill expected demand, such as
excess plant capacity or inventory. Insufficient operational slack can lead to reduced
responsiveness to production disruptions and reduced reliability in product deliver-
ies. For example, the sustained rain and the subsequent flooding in Thailand during
the monsoon in 2011 suspended manufacturing operations for various components.
This supply disruption resulted in downstream production delays for Intel, Western
Digital, Toyota, Honda, Goodyear, Nikon, and Sony (Tibken, 2011). Alternately,
Deere and Co., the world’s largest producer of tractors and combines, announced in
May 2012 that it was investing heavily in capacity expansions and increasing finished
goods inventories to better manage anticipated future global demand (Tita, 2012). In
addition to buffering potential supply and demand mismatches, operational slack can
also be leveraged as a competitive advantage, as exemplified by Hyundai’s response
to the March 2011 earthquake in Japan. The earthquake and subsequent tsunami led
to parts shortages from Japanese suppliers that forced temporary plant shutdowns of
most major automobile manufacturers, who maintained tight control over their in-
ventory levels (Terlap & Winterstein, 2011; Terlap, 2011). This shortage resulted in
a competitive advantage for Hyundai, whose production facilities were largely unaf-
fected by the supply disruptions since the South Korean automaker sourced only 1%
of their subcomponents from Japanese suppliers (Choi, 2011). Hyundai responded
to the supply problems of other manufacturers by increasing its production output
from its underutilized facilities in an effort to supply product to customers that were
unable to purchase cars from Hyundai’s competitors (Choi, 2011). In all of these
cases, slack resources such as capacity utilization, raw material, and finished goods
inventories can be leveraged to better manage supply and demand mismatches.
On the other hand, operational scope represents a firm’s breadth of product of-
fering, geographical diversification, and the extent to which a firm’s production tech-
nologies can operate cost effectively (Tang & Tikoo, 1999; Vokurka & O’Leary-Kelly,
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2000; Ramdas, 2003; Boyabatlı & Toktay, 2004; Benito-Osorio et al., 2012). Diverse
product offerings allow firms to better manage product specific sales fluctuations
while broadening their market reach, as exemplified by Starbucks’ recent decision to
acquire ”a bakery and a fresh juice company, while also launching a line of energy
drinks and an espresso brewer” (Gasparro, 2012). Similarly, Samsung, a global leader
in consumer electronics, is now exploring diversifying its product portfolio to include
LED lighting, mobile networks, set-top boxes, and medical devices to tap into new
market opportunities (Huang, 2013). In 2011, Johnson and Johnson, a ”maker of
products ranging from Band-Aids to the anti-inflammatory drug Remicade flexed its
diversification muscles, with sales growth of pharmaceutical and medical-device prod-
ucts helping to offset the sales decline for [highly competitive] OTC drugs” (Loftus,
2011). Additionally, firms can diversify with respect to manufacturing and sales lo-
cations, capitalizing on variances in regional or country specific economic conditions
(Boyabatlı & Toktay, 2004; Linebaugh & Hagerty, 2011). Chrylser, BMW, Mercedes
Benz, and Audi have all recently leveraged higher sales in developing countries to
offset the sales declines in Europe for high end automobiles (Bennett, 2011; McGrath
& Rauwald, 2012). Further, Volkswagen recently announced global expansion in pro-
duction capabilities for its core Volkswagen models as well as its higher end Audi
division to include Southeast Asia and another North American facility (Lee, 2010;
Rauwald, 2012). Firms also have the ability to use their production technology to
alter the range of output within their manufacturing facilities. As a benefit from the
recent acquisition of Chrysler, Fiat plans to leverage its new production capabilities
by producing Chrysler, Fiat, and Maserati automobiles (a subdivision under Fiat) in
the same assembly plants (Bennett, 2011).
Studies have separately found mixed support for the effects of operational slack
and operational scope on performance, profitability, innovation, and the effectiveness
of operational risk management initiatives (Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Daniel et al.,
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2004; Vokurka & O’Leary-Kelly, 2000). While Daniel et al. (2004) find that slack re-
sources strengthen firm performance, there is also evidence supporting lean operations
(efficient production with minimal inventories), such that slack resources may hinder
performance (Modi & Mishra, 2011). Similarly, while Swamidass and Newell (1987)
find support for “manufacturing flexibility” (broad product and process scopes) im-
proving performance in uncertain markets, Pagell and Krause (2004) later contradict
these findings. Research is ongoing to better understand if and when narrow op-
erational scopes yield higher performance outcomes compared to broad operational
scopes (Mukherjee et al., 2000; Ketokivi & Jokinen, 2006; Goyal & Netessine, 2007).
Overall, findings relating operational scope and operational slack to firm performance
remain mixed.
We attempt to resolve some of these contradictory findings by examining the
effects of slack resources and operational scope while explicitly considering compo-
nents of a firm’s dynamic environment. This research views environmental dynamism
as consisting of two distinct components, unpredictability and instability. Unpre-
dictability is the “lack of regularity in the pattern of change in an environment”,
while instability is “the extent to which an environment exhibits change” (Miller
et al., 2006). Industries could have varying levels of unpredictability and instability.
The apparel and consumer electronics industries both experience seasonal demand
cycles (thus both industries are unstable), but the apparel industry is much more
unpredictable due to the difficulty in forecasting consumer tastes (Abubakar et al.,
2010). Consumer electronics sales, however, follow well understood seasonal patterns
such that peak holiday season sales can be accurately forecasted, resulting in an un-
stable but not unpredictable industrial environment. Alternately, the food products
industry experiences relatively small seasonal variations on the sales of food prod-
ucts, but the sales do not necessarily follow predictable patterns in the long-run. For
example, according to a recent DataMonitor report, product failure rates in the food
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industry are as high as 50 percent due to the unpredictability of consumer tastes
(Scott-Thomas, 2012). Therefore, the food products industry is stable but unpre-
dictable. We investigate how operational slack and operational scope moderate the
effects of unpredictability and instability on industry-adjusted firm performance.
This study contributes to the operations strategy literature by identifying the
role of operational slack and operational scope on firm performance in the presence
of environmental dynamism. The analyses focus at the firm level and investigate
how operational slack (as measured by plant capacity utilization, cash to cash cycles,
and inventory level decisions) and operational scope (as measured by the breadth
of a firm’s product offering, breadth of the geographical regions in which the firm
operates, and the extent to which a firm’s production technologies can operate cost
effectively) influence the performance of firms that operate in unpredictable and un-
stable environments.
This research also extends the work of Anand and Ward (2004) and Azadegan et al.
(2013). Anand and Ward (2004) examine the role of operational flexibility (mobility
and range) at the plant level for firms operating under different forms of environmental
dynamism (unpredictability and volatility). The current study additionally considers
the role of operational slack in dynamic environments, but more importantly, iden-
tifies the relative importance of operational slack versus operational scope (related
but distinct from operational flexibility) in unpredictable and unstable environments.
Azadegan and colleagues (2013) examine how operational slack influences new ven-
ture survival under environmental dynamism, complexity, and munificence. Whereas
their study focused on the survivability of young and small firms that have limited
resources, operational scope was not considered. We not only consider operational
scope in addition to operational slack, but focus on larger and established firms to
determine how they influence relative firm performance in unstable and unpredictable
markets (two components of environmental dynamism). By jointly considering these
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factors, we further untangle the relationship between operational scope, operational
slack, and environmental dynamism and firm performance.
By considering two distinct components of environmental dynamism, instabil-
ity and unpredictability, we hypothesize (and find) that increased operational scope
enhances firm performance in unpredictable markets, whereas operational slack en-
hances firm performance in unstable markets. The consideration of a firm’s envi-
ronment along the dimensions of instability and unpredictability bears importance,
because it reveals that it is not always beneficial to invest in increased operational
scope, operational slack, or both simultaneously1. This analysis offers guidance to
resource-constrained managers in their attempts to effectively manage their opera-
tions in dynamic environments.
In the next section, we review the prior literature on slack, scope, and dynamism
and present theoretical hypotheses. Next, we describe the data, measures, and meth-
ods used to test the hypotheses. Lastly, we present the results from the study and
then discuss their theoretical contributions and managerial implications.
2.2 Theory and Hypotheses
Operational scope and operational slack can both be utilized to manage operations in
dynamic environments. In this section, we briefly describe the concept of environmen-
tal dynamism, classify its unpredictability and instability components, and elaborate
on the two operational strategies of scope and slack specifically highlighting their re-
spective roles in the face of environmental dynamism. Next, we conceptualize how the
two operational strategies moderate the relationship between these two components
1Analyses in the robustness section show non-significant effects of squared terms of operational
scope or operational slack indicators on performance. The interaction of squared terms of opera-
tional scope and unpredictability and operational slack and instability were not significant. Finally,
operational scope and instability or operational slack and unpredictability have no significant effect
on performance.
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of dynamism and firm performance.
2.2.1 Environmental Dynamism
Dess and Beard (1984) succinctly categorized the environment of organizations along
three dimensions: munificence, dynamism, and complexity. Through a path analytic
model, Keats and Hitt (1988) then attempted to understand how each of these three
different dimensions of the environment influenced a firm’s decisions and subsequent
performance. Their findings indicate that environmental dynamism was the “domi-
nant influence” regarding firm decisions and performance. Dynamism, as defined by
Dess and Beard (1984, p.56), is “change that is hard to predict and that heightens
uncertainty”. In the presence of industry dynamism, the resource allocation decisions
of firms can largely influence the ability of firms to outperform competitors and main-
tain a competitive advantage (Sirmon et al., 2007). As such, it is well documented
that it is more challenging to manage firms in highly dynamic environments, and per-
formance is therefore negatively affected by high levels of environmental dynamism
(Keats & Hitt, 1988; Goll & Rasheed, 1997; Robert Baum & Wally, 2003).
Recognizing that environmental dynamism is a multidimensional construct, Who-
ley and Brittain (1989) deconstructed environmental dynamism into four separate
dimensions: amplitude, predictability, frequency, and instability. Their findings im-
plied that three of these dimensions were unique, with amplitude and instability
highly correlated to one another. These three dimensions were later collapsed into
two distinct components, instability and unpredictability (Miller et al., 2006).
2.2.2 Unpredictability and Instability
Unpredictability refers to the “lack of regularity in the pattern of change in an environ-
ment” (Miller et al., 2006, p.104). This aspect of dynamism deals with the deviations
in the future supply and demand requirements of a firm from their expected patterns,
resulting in the inability to accurately forecast production requirements. Instability
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refers to “the extent to which an environment exhibits change” (Miller et al., 2006,
p.101). This aspect of the environment relates to both the frequency of change and
the magnitude of change over time and is indicative of the volatility of an industry
(Wholey & Brittain, 1989). Each of these dimensions can uniquely influence the ben-
efits of operational slack and operational scope (Ketokivi & Jokinen, 2006; Eisenhardt
et al., 2010).
Figure 2.1 graphically illustrates the distinction between instability and unpre-
dictability. Each of the four charts represents the quarterly demand from a firm
given either high or low unpredictability or instability; with the x-axes representing
sequential time periods (quarters) for a firm and the y-axes the associated product de-
mand for each quarter. For exposition and comparative purposes, each representative
demand pattern in the figure has the same historical average and no trend component,
such that the specific component of environmental dynamism can be illustrated. The
upper left quadrant represents industries which are both unstable and unpredictable,
such that the overall demand for products is volatile and does not follow recognizable
patterns. General Dynamics, a firm that manufactures aerospace, marine, and combat
systems products represents a firm operating in an unstable and unpredictable indus-
try. The upper right quadrant represents unpredictable but stable markets. General
Mills, a well-diversified food product manufacturer operates in such markets, where
the overall fluctuations in seasonal demand are low, but unpredictable. The lower left
quadrant represents predictable, but unstable markets such that the overall market
demands may follow expected patterns with high seasonal variations. Sony Corpora-
tion operates in such an environment, where the overall demand pattern for consumer
electronics is predictable, but highly varied between seasons. Lastly, the lower right
quadrant represents industries that are both predictable and stable. Exxon Mobil, the
world’s largest publicly traded fossil fuel processor, operates in an environment that
experiences low seasonal variations in the demand for fuel which can be accurately
11
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Figure 2.1: Unpredictability and Instability
2.2.3 Operational Scope
Porter (1985) describes how managing the scope of a firm’s activities (operational
scope) is a crucial determinant in achieving a competitive advantage over rivals.
Specifically, we investigate three forms of operational scope: product scope, geo-
graphic scope, and process scope. Considering these three aspects, firms with larger
product portfolios, higher levels of geographical diversification and the ability to uti-
lize production technologies to cost effectively alter production output are considered
firms with broad operational scope. Conversely, narrow scoped firms focus on a lim-
ited set of products, lower levels of geographical diversification and limited production
capabilities (Skinner, 1969, 1974; Hayes & Wheelwright, 1984; Porter, 1985). These
dimensions of operational scope have been extensively studied, both analytically and
empirically, in operations management, strategy, marketing, and economics litera-
ture, with excellent literature reviews published on the topic (Pesch & Schroeder,
1996; Palich et al., 2000; Kirca et al., 2011; Nippa et al., 2011). Therefore, our intent
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is to study the broader role of operational scope in dynamic environments with respect
to firm performance. Figure 2 portrays the conceptual framework of the proposed
model and the associated hypotheses.
Figure 2.2: Proposed Model
2.2.3.1 Product Scope
The breadth of a firm’s product portfolio reflects the firm’s product scope, such that
firms with a larger portfolio have a broader product scope. The potential benefits
from a broader product scope are documented in the industrial organization eco-
nomics and strategy literature (Palepu, 1985). However, this stream of research, when
viewed in entirety, indicates there is no “universally valid nature of the diversification-
performance linkage” (Bausch & Pils, 2009, p.179). Benito-Osorio et al. (2012, p.335)
provide some potential rationale for the historically inconsistent conclusions, suggest-
ing that that the performance benefits accruing from product diversification may
indeed be “environment dependent”.
Product scope has also been examined from the perspective of both operations
management and marketing. Kekre and Srinivasan (1990) focused on consumer and
industrial goods firms (both classified as unpredictable environments in our data)
and proposed that increased product breadth would increase costs and market share,
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and that the incremental sales in turn would translate into increased profits. How-
ever, they do not find support for increased costs. Morgan and Rego (2009) find
that broad product scopes improve market share, but hinder cash flows. Randall and
Ulrich (2001) provide a more nuanced view of the incremental costs associated with
broad product lines, separating the costs into production and market mediation costs.
Production costs deal directly with the tooling and establishment of manufacturing
capability, as well as the incremental operating and maintenance costs incurred. Mar-
ket mediating costs involve the additional transportation and inventory holding costs
as well as potential mark-downs on product pricing resulting from supply and demand
mismatches. The authors suggest that the market mediation costs will generally in-
crease with demand uncertainty. While there is evidence that these costs do increase
with uncertainty, prior literature suggests that increased product breadth is an ef-
fective means to deal with increased uncertainty, as the risks of supply and demand
mismatches can be spread over a greater number of products. This view is consis-
tent with Ramdas (2003, p.81), that “variety creation and variety implementation
decisions determine a firm’s responsiveness to demand uncertainty”.
We synthesize these differing perspectives from economics, strategy and opera-
tions literature and posit that the benefits from broad product scopes dominate the
market mediation costs when demand is unpredictable. However, when demand is
predictable, the additional production costs associated with a broad product scope
hinder firm performance; i.e., the portfolio benefits and market mediation costs asso-
ciated with a diverse product are both muted when demand is predictable, but the
incremental production costs remain. For predictable environments, this hypothesis
supports the concept of focused factory (Skinner, 1974), and provides performance
related empirical testing of the conclusions from Ketokivi and Jokinen (2006, p.261),
who find that “firms tend to be more focused if demand is predictable”.
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Hypothesis 1a - A broader Product Scope strengthens (weakens) firm per-
formance in unpredictable (predictable) markets.
2.2.3.2 Geographic Scope
A second aspect of operational scope, geographic scope, considers the operational
implications of the locations in which firms can produce and sell their products; i.e.,
their geographic diversification (Boyabatlı & Toktay, 2004). Considering geographical
diversification as an aspect of operational scope used to manage dynamic environ-
ments is succinctly described by Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994, p.124); “the economic
merits of the international firm as a network are derived from the option value of
multinational operating flexibility under the critical condition of uncertainty”. Geo-
graphically diversified production capabilities increase a firm’s scope by allowing the
firm to exploit market imperfections in the pricing, availability, and transportation of
materials (Hitt et al., 1997). Geographic diversification also allows firms to globally
reallocate production based on geographic differences in supply and transportation
costs to fulfill their overall demands. Additionally, by locating production facilities
close to end customers, firms can better ensure that their production costs and sales
revenues are exposed to the same geographical and/or country specific risks and ex-
change rate uncertainties (Boyabatlı & Toktay, 2004; Kim et al., 2006).
While several studies have found that geographical diversification improves firm
performance due to the ability to shift production requirements and/or align costs
and revenues to the same currency (Kim et al., 1993; Tang & Tikoo, 1999; Goerzen &
Beamish, 2003; Kim et al., 2006; Kumar, 2009; Kirca et al., 2011), some additionally
find an inverted U-shaped relationship similar to the relationship sometimes found
from broad product scopes (Hitt et al., 1997; Qian et al., 2010; Lampel & Giachetti,
2013), and others find a strictly negative relationship between geographical diver-
sification and firm value (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Denis et al., 2002; Kim & Mathur,
15
2008). The arguments for (and against) geographical diversification are theoretically
analogous to those for product diversification.
When production facilities are located far from customers, the distance creates
longer forecast horizons and replenishment lead times, which are exacerbated by
demand uncertainty (Randall & Ulrich, 2001). This implies that when demand is
unpredictable, then having geographically dispersed operations capabilities can mini-
mize the associated market mediation costs (Randall & Ulrich, 2001). But, if demand
were predictable, then the benefits from operating a globally distributed production
network may not be sufficient to warrant their operations and maintenance costs. We
hypothesize that broad geographic scopes are performance enhancing in unpredictable
markets, but not so in predictable markets.
Hypothesis 1b - A broader Geographic Scope strengthens (weakens) firm
performance in unpredictable (predictable) markets.
2.2.3.3 Process Scope
The third aspect of operational scope, process scope, considers the extent to which a
firm can utilize its production technology to profitably alter its output. Said differ-
ently, process scope embodies attributes of both mix flexibility and volume flexibility,
previously considered in the literature as two components of “Flexible Manufacturing
Capability” (Zhang et al., 2003). Mix flexibility has been generally defined as “the
ability of a manufacturing system to effectively produce a wide variety of different
products” (Pagell & Krause, 2004, p.635)(Pagell and Krause, 2004, p.635), or more
specifically as “being able to handle a range of products or variants with fast se-
tups” (Gerwin, 1993, p.398). Volume flexibility has been defined as “the ability to
operate economically at different production volumes” (da Silveira, 2006, p.934) or
“the ability to effectively increase or decrease aggregate production in response to cus-
tomers” (Pagell & Krause, 2004, p.635). Each of these definitions implies a dimension
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of flexibility that is independent from the other, which is conceptually distinct, but
practically impossible to separate, as each of these two dimensions are highly depen-
dent on one another when firms produce a variety of products. To our knowledge, the
only plausible way these could be measured independently is if a firm ran a constant
production volume but with different products (thus allowing an accurate measure of
mix flexibility), or only produced a singular, perfectly homogenous product at varying
production volumes (thus allowing an accurate measure of volume flexibility). More-
over, this sentiment was initially described by Mukherjee et al. (2000) who noted
that “volume heterogeneity” between different products in a firm may result in stable
aggregate demand, yet the proportion of demand for each product the firm produces
may change unpredictably. Mukherjee et al. (2000) found that narrow process scopes
did not improve firm performance when volume heterogeneity (a combination of mix
flexibility and volume flexibility) increased with unpredictability.
Our conceptualization of process scope is similar to the notion of “volume hetero-
geneity” proposed by Mukherjee et al. (2000), which incorporates attributes of mix
and volume flexibility by recognizing that firms produce a variety of products with
different production volumes, and this variety and volume change over time. Firms
have the ability to invest in resources that allow a broader process scope, thus allow-
ing for a greater variety of production mix and volume with minimal cost penalties.
Alternatively, firms can focus on a narrow process scope which attempts to “reduce
costs by relying on the benefits of task specialization” (Gerwin, 1993). If firms are
able to shift production from one product type to another more cost effectively than
their competitors, they will have a competitive advantage in dynamic markets. Con-
sider for instance two firms that each produces two products of differing volumes,
each product for a different market. If the demands for the two products are neg-
atively correlated, then the firm that can shift production levels between the two
products more efficiently will have a strategic competitive cost advantage (Goyal &
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Netessine, 2011). Alternatively, if there is little demand uncertainty, then the costs
associated with the ability to efficiently shift production levels may not be justi-
fied, as the demand forecasts can be perfectly planned and managed through more
focused production methods (Skinner, 1974). Such scenarios have been previously
modeled normatively, where increased scope with respect to volume or production
mix is proposed to increase in performance with demand uncertainty (Lee & Tang,
1997; Van Mieghem, 1998; Chod & Rudi, 2005). Process scope allows for a larger
range of profitable production that can be used to mitigate the negative consequences
from unpredictable environments. Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1c - A broader Process Scope strengthens (weakens) firm per-
formance in unpredictable (predictable) markets.
2.2.4 Operational Slack
Slack resources allow firms to “adjust to gross shifts in the external environment
with minimal trauma” (Bourgeois III, 1981, p.31). Slack resources were historically
viewed from the perspective of the organization, and operationalized by investigating
factors such as: general and administrative expenses, debt to equity ratios, credit
ratings, working capital, R&D expenditures, and the number of employees in a firm
(Bourgeois III, 1981; Daniel et al., 2004; Mishina et al., 2004; Voss et al., 2008).
Several studies have found that slack resources, at least to some extent, enhance firm
performance (Daniel et al., 2004; George, 2005; Tseng et al., 2007; Wefald et al., 2010;
Goldstein & Iossifova, 2012).
George (2005) studied the impact of slack resources in privately held firms and
found that some slack was beneficial for firms, but too much was detrimental to
performance, implying a curvilinear relationship between slack and performance. Al-
though, this study investigated slack resources as they relate to performance, it did
not consider the influence of a firm’s environment. Tseng et al. (2007) find a similar
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curvilinear relationship between organizational slack and multinational growth, such
that some slack was beneficial but too much was detrimental. Wefald et al. (2010)
recognized that the performance enhancing benefits of slack resources are dependent
on the specific industry for which a firm operates. A meta-analysis by Daniel et al.
(2004) that documents the relationship between slack resources and firm performance
echoes the sentiment that these resources are beneficial for firms, and the results are
more significant if the analysis includes industry-specific differentiation. Thus, a con-
sistent theme underlying the previous literature is that slack resources, to some extent,
increase performance, and these benefits are highlighted when a firm’s industry affil-
iation is incorporated into the study. However, less is known on how the underlying
dynamic aspects of industries influence the slack to performance relationship.
Bourgeois (1981, p.34) proposed that “raw materials and finished-goods invento-
ries represent slack resources used as technical core buffers, work-in-process inven-
tories represent interdepartment buffersanother measure would be excess capacity”.
Sharfman et al. (1988, p.603) later proposes that “slack resources are physical en-
tities such as cash, people, nonobsolete inventory, machine capacity and so forth”.
Hendricks et al. (2009) additionally consider the overall slack in a firm’s supply chain,
as measured by the firm’s cash-to-cash cycle (also referred to as trade cycle). This
measure includes not only the physical inventory of the focal firm, but also the ac-
counts payables owed to the firm’s suppliers and the accounts receivables owed from
the firm’s customers. All else being equal, a firm with a larger cash-to-cash cycle
will have more operational slack in their supply chain; i.e., a lower cash-to-cash cy-
cle is an indicator of a firm’s supply chain leanness (Hendricks et al., 2009). We will
adopt these definitions, and focus on the operations specific slack resources mentioned.
Specifically, we will investigate three different aspects of operational slack: inventory
slack, capacity slack, and supply chain slack. It is important to distinctly separate
operational slack from operational scope, recognizing that investing in inventory or
19
lower capacity utilization does not necessarily increase a firm’s scope (Jack & Raturi,
2003). These definitions of operational slack are widely adopted and consistent with
those from prior studies (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; Tang,
2006; Hendricks et al., 2009; Azadegan et al., 2013).
We view capacity utilization, inventory levels, and cash-to-cash cycles as decisions
firms make in order to have the ability to tactically manage the supply and demand
mismatches that may occur in dynamic environments. Although firms with high ca-
pacity utilizations for their production capabilities may be more efficient than firms
with lower capacity utilizations, firms with lower capacity utilizations may be better
able to respond to changes in supply and demand by utilizing their excess capacity.
Similarly, firms with smaller inventories or cash-to-cash cycles that employ just-in-
time production techniques may not be able to adjust to dynamic markets as well as
those with larger inventories that can buffer supply and demand variability. In this
respect, this research will contribute to the lean operations literature, which investi-
gates the benefits of efficient inventory and production practices (low slack). While
several studies indicate that lean/efficient operations enhance profitability (Capon
et al., 1990; Shah & Ward, 2003; Eroglu & Hofer, 2011; Modi & Mishra, 2011), others
have found that slack resources improve firm performance (Daniel et al., 2004; George,
2005; Goldstein & Iossifova, 2012). We hope to provide insights into these conflicting
findings by additionally considering the industry specific dynamic environments of
firms that invest in operational slack.
Since slack resources allow a firm to tactically deploy assets needed to manage
supply and demand mismatches, this operational strategy of investing in slack re-
sources could lead to a competitive advantage in unstable industries. The unstable
aspect of environmental dynamism as it relates to operational slack leads to the next
set of hypotheses. Hypothesis 2a, 2b, and 2c propose that each aspect of a firm’s
operational slack will enhance firm performance in unstable environments more so
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than those in stable environments.
Hypothesis 2 - Operational Slack [represented as: (a) capacity slack, (b)
inventory slack, and (c) supply chain slack] strengthens (weakens) firm
performance in unstable (stable) markets.
2.3 Data
Since the conceptualization and the measures of operational scope and operational
slack focus on various aspects related to product manufacturing (and not provision
of services), our sampling criteria considers firms in the manufacturing sector (SIC
code: 20 to 39) and we collect data on these firms from COMPUSTAT between 1998
and 2007. To reliably draw panel data estimates, we use the following filters: (a) at
least five years of continuous financial information is available in COMPUSTAT; (b)
as more than 100 percent growth rate is less likely in large publicly traded firms and
such firms must have likely acquired other firms we drop these firms; and finally (c) to
avoid firms under financial distress, firms must have an average yearly stock price of at
least $3. Firms with distressed assets are more likely to adopt operational strategies
less geared towards increasing competitive advantage and more geared towards firm
survival (Khanna & Poulsen, 1995), and as such are not included. Based on these
selection criteria, we identified 964 firms representing 8,473 firm-years from 1998 to
2007. Table 2.1 shows the distribution of firms and firm-years across different industry
categories.
Dependent Variable - Industry-median adjusted ROA (t). From an opera-
tions management perspective, return on assets (ROA) proxies for both profitability
and efficiency in utilization of assets. Therefore, to measure firm performance, we
operationalize ROA for each firm year (t) and subtract the median industry (2-digit
SIC) ROA in year (t) from firm’s ROA in year (t).
Independent Variables. Based on Miller et al. (2006), instability is measured using
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Table 2.1: Sample Composition and Distribution
Sample Composition 
 
 Number of firm years Percent Number of 
Firms 
Percent 
Full Sample 8,473 100% 964 100% 
Composition by S&P Index     
S&P 500 3,575 42.19% 323 33.48% 
S&P 400 Mid Cap 2,528 29.84% 258 26.79% 
S&P 600 Small Cap 2,370 27.97% 383 39.73% 
 
Distribution of Firm-year observations by firm type 
 
 Firm Year 
Frequency 
% Firms Instability Unpredictability t-test 
difference 
Food Products 326 3.85% 0.169 0.425 6.726 
Recreational products 92 1.09% 0.617 0.603 0.205 
Printing and Publishing 269 3.17% 0.065 0.203 2.305 
Consumer Goods 320 3.78% 0.480 0.570 2.761 
Apparel 272 3.21% 0.580 0.563 0.966 
Medical Equipment 281 3.32% 0.263 0.198 0.813 
Pharmaceutical products 486 5.74% 0.149 0.058 1.954 
Chemicals 432 5.10% 0.544 0.565 3.908 
Rubber and Plastic 
Products 102 1.20% 0.115 0.151 1.245 
Construction Materials 263 3.10% 0.135 0.207 2.175 
Construction 272 3.21% 0.142 0.209 2.306 
Steel works etc. 288 3.40% 0.090 0.211 2.496 
Machinery 581 6.86% 0.525 0.602 1.185 
Electrical Equipment 228 2.69% 0.613 0.282 7.076 
Automobile and trucks 323 3.81% 0.138 0.212 0.217 
Petroleum and Gas 354 4.18% 0.066 0.121 0.618 
Telecommunications 170 2.01% 0.601 0.368 5.609 
Computers 502 5.92% 0.516 0.301 6.424 
Electronic Equipment 947 11.18% 0.527 0.313 5.739 
Measuring and Control 
Equipment 291 3.43% 0.604 0.469 3.837 
Business Supplies 297 3.51% 0.113 0.116 0.467 
Transportation 574 6.77% 0.132 0.197 2.587 
Other* 803 9.48% 0.615 0.684 0.215 
*Other industries include those industries that have less than 20 observations: 
Agriculture, Aircraft, Alcoholic beverages, Candy and soda, Defense, 
Entertainment, Fabricated products, Miscellaneous, Nonmetallic mining, 
Precious metals, Real estate, Ship building and railroad equipment, Shipping 
containers, Textiles, and Tobacco products. 
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three indicators: (i) amplitude of change; (ii) average magnitude of instability; and
(iii) frequency of changes in fortune. We measure unpredictability using two indica-
tors: (i) magnitude of unpredictability and (ii) proportional unpredictability (Miller
et al., 2006). We collect quarterly industry sales information of all COMPUSTAT
firms listed by 2-digit SIC codes, and use 20 quarters of time series industry sales
data to establish a rolling five-year window of quarterly sales for all the indicators.
Instability - For amplitude of change, the natural log of sales for each firm are
first adjusted by the industry specific natural log of total industry assets. Next, a
seasonal adjustment index for sales is created, which accounts for growth trends,
decline trends, and cyclical trends (Brocklebank & Dickey, 2003; Hylleberg, 1992).
This seasonal adjustment index is the ratio of the observed sales over the season-
ally and growth adjusted quarter-specific moving average (Wholey & Brittain, 1989).
Amplitude of change is the difference between the largest and smallest values of the
seasonal adjustment index in the five-year rolling window, where higher values indi-
cate increased deviation from the average adjusted industry sales trends. The average
magnitude of instability is the standard error derived by regressing quarterly indus-
try sales over 20 quarters. Higher values indicate increased instability in industry
sales. The frequency of changes in fortune relates to changes in industry trends from
positive to negative or from negative to positive. The slopes of the industry sales
data between each quarter are chronologically tabulated. When the slope remains
positive or negative between two consecutive quarters, the latter quarter is coded as
1, whereas the quarter is coded as 0 if there is a change in trend (positive to negative
slope or negative to positive slope) between quarters. We then count the total number
of slope reversals (change from 1 to 0) and divide it by 20. Higher values indicate a
higher frequency of change in fortune.
The item loadings for amplitude of change (= 0.905, t = 12.138, p < 0.001),
average magnitude of instability (= 0.872, t = 9.317, p < 0.001), and frequency of
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changes in fortune (= 0.942, t = 15.409, p < 0.001) on instability (α = 0.806) were
significant.
Unpredictability - The magnitude of unpredictability is the “average size of
fluctuations after controlling for systematic change involving growth, decline, and
cyclicality” (Miller et al., 2006). It is measured as the standard error from a linear
regression of the amplitudes derived from the amplitude of change measure. Stan-
dard errors indicate the average fluctuation in the seasonally adjusted sales data such
that higher values indicate higher magnitudes of unpredictability. Proportional unpre-
dictability is the degree to which the environment does not follow a consistent pattern
over time. Unpredictability is greater if the ratio of irregular or unsystematic change
to total change is higher (Wholey & Brittain, 1989). Controlling for growth, cycli-
cal, and declining trends in X-11-ARIMA , industry wide current quarter sales are
regressed on prior quarter sales (Brocklebank & Dickey, 2003; Hylleberg, 1992). The
adjusted-R2 indicates the degree to which prior quarter’s sales predict the current
quarter sales. Higher values indicate higher proportional unpredictability whereas
lower values indicate lower proportional unpredictability.
The two indicators for unpredictability, magnitude of unpredictability (= 0.864, t =
11.906, p < 0.001) and proportional unpredictability (= 0.923, t = 13.062, p < 0.001),
also exhibited significant loadings and acceptable inter-item correlation (r = 0.665; p <
0.001, two-tailed).
Moderator Variables. We define three measures of operational scope: (a) product
scope, (b) geographic scope, and (3) process scope. Based on Hendricks et al. (2009),
we define three measures of operational slack: (a) capacity slack, (b) inventory slack,
and (c) supply chain slack. All moderator variables are adjusted for the industry-
median at the 2-digit SIC code level.
Operational Scope (t−1) - Product scope is measured as one minus the Herfind-
ahl index of sales concentrations across product segments, as reported on Form SFAS
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131, which began reporting in 1997 (Hendricks et al., 2009; Kumar, 2009). Form
SFAS 131 (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131) is an accounting
standard requiring firms to disclose financial and descriptive information pertaining
to the products and services, major customers, and geographic areas for which firms
participate (FASB, 1997). The Herfindahl index for the product scope of firm k
(PSkHerf ) is calculated as the summation of the square of the ratios of the annual
sales in each product segment i to the annual total sales of the firm for the prior year



















where S(i) are the sales in product segment i and S are the total sales across all
segments. We measure the product scope for firm k as PSk = 1 − PSkHerf , where a
higher value indicates a larger breadth of product scope than a lower value.
Geographic scope is measured similarly to product scope, which is measured as
one minus the Herfindahl index of sales concentrations across geographic regions, as
reported on Form SFAS 131 (Hendricks et al., 2009; Kumar, 2009). The Herfindahl
index for the geographic scope of firm k (GSkHerf ) is calculated as the summation of
the square of the ratios of the annual sales in each geographic region j to the annual
total sales of the firm for the prior year (t−1) for all geographic regions M , subtracted



















where S(j) are the sales in geographic segment j and S are the total sales across all
segments. We measure the geographic scope for firm k as GSk = 1−GSkHerf , where
a higher value indicates a larger breadth of product scope than a lower value.
Process scope is measured as the firm’s ability to cost effectively manage variations
in demand, which is proxied by variations in sales. Specifically, we measure the process
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scope of firm k (RSk) as the past five year’s ratio of the variance in total sales (S) to













This measure for process scope was additionally proposed by Jack and Raturi
(2003) as a means to measure volume flexibility considering the effective use of a
firm’s production technology (and not inventory). Additionally, this measure is the
inverse of the amplification ratio used by Cachon et al. (2007), which was used to
measure the bullwhip effect faced by firms in response to demand variations. From
our measure, a higher process scope ratio (RS) indicates that the firm is better able
to cost effectively manage its sales variations than a lower ratio.
Operational Slack (t − 1) - Capacity Slack is measured by the ratio of yearly
net property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to annual sales in the prior year (t− 1) of
firm k, which is adjusted by the median value for the industry as determined by the













Firms with a lower capacity slack ratio (CS) are utilizing their production capa-
bilities (capacity) much more efficiently than those with higher capacity slack ratios;
but, this additionally implies that they may not be able to respond to extreme varia-
tions in demand as cost effectively as those with more excess capacity. A higher ratio
of PPE to sales indicates higher slack.
Inventory slack is measured as the days of inventory for the firm in the prior year,
which is calculated by dividing the firm’s average inventory (INV) in the prior year
by their annual cost of goods (COGS) in the prior year, multiplied by 365 days and
adjusted by the median value for the industry as determined by the 2-digit SIC code














Firms with higher inventory slack (IS) are better able to respond to variations
in demand by utilizing finished goods inventory as opposed to altering production
processes than firms with lower inventory slack.
Supply chain slack (SS) is measured by the industry adjusted cash-to-cash cycle
of the firm in the prior year, which is the days of inventory plus days of accounts














The industry adjusted supply chain slack for firm k (SSk) is calculated by sub-

















A higher SS value indicates more slack in the supply chain, which includes the
inventory of the focal firm as well as the accounts receivables from the firm’s customers
and account’s payables to the firm’s suppliers.
Controls. Larger firms are more likely to absorb the impacts of instability and un-
predictability than smaller firms, and therefore could experience less deterioration
in firm performance when facing unstable or unpredictable environments. Similarly,
older firms face lower liabilities of newness, and have well developed operational rou-
tines and capabilities to manage environmental changes. Industry-adjusted firm size
is measured as the natural log of assets minus the median natural log of assets at the
4-digit SIC industry level, and firm age as the number of years since the firm was
established.
We also control for two additional environmental conditions: environmental com-
plexity and environmental munificence. Environmental complexity at the industry
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Mean, SD, and Correlation Table 




6.07 5.34 1             
2. Firm Age 28.44 21.72 0.089 1            
3. Environmental 
Complexity 
–0.87 0.22 –0.202 0.035 1           
4. Environmental 
Munificence 
0.34 0.18 0.367 0.292 0.157 1          
5. Instability 0.53 0.12 –0.238 –0.134 0.392 0.155 1         
6. Unpredictability 0.42 0.10 –0.346 –0.202 0.292 0.279 0.375 1        
7. Capacity Slack 0.13 0.21 0.083 0.167 0.109 0.156 0.038 0.062 1       
8. Inventory Slack 0.09 0.28 0.149 0.045 0.153 0.089 0.168 0.190 0.128 1      
9. Supply Chain 
Slack 
0.03 0.05 0.123 0.100 0.076 0.031 0.044 0.115 0.113 0.256 1     
10. Process Scope 0.82 1.13 0.197 0.158 0.163 0.073 0.016 0.145 0.047 0.050 0.186 1    
11. Product Scope 0.11 0.53 0.115 0.149 0.016 0.101 0.137 0.128 0.043 0.161 0.038 0.129 1   
12. Geographic 
Scope 
0.22 0.08 0.198 0.049 0.022 0.163 0.144 0.140 0.162 0.139 0.052 0.132 0.168 1  
13. Industry–
adjusted ROA 
0.04 0.17 0.110 0.071 –0.217 0.118 –0.146 –0.268 0.094 0.121 0.096 0.103 0.125 0.079 0.249 
Notes. 
N=964 firms representing 8,473 firm–years from 1998 to 2007.  
All correlations above |0.086| are significant at 0.05 or below (two–tailed) 
All correlations above |0.121| are significant at 0.01 or below (two–tailed) 
level is the concentration of market share among industry participants. Based on
Heeley, King, and Covin (2006), we regress the market shares of firms in year t − 5
on the market shares of firms in year t. A positive beta indicates increasing market
share and therefore increasing concentration over time. To facilitate interpretation,
we multiply beta by −1, so that higher values indicate decreasing concentration and
therefore increasing complexity. Environmental munificence at the industry level is
the beta of regression of yearly sales from t − 5 to t on time (Heeley et al., 2006).
Higher betas indicate increasing sales over time and therefore increasing environ-
mental munificence. Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics and correlations of the
variables in the model.
2.4 Results
Our data consists of firm panels with continuous information for at least five continu-
ous years. We begin by assessing the relevance of pooled OLS regression, fixed-effects,
or random-effects regressions. To identify the correct model for our estimation, we
start with an OLS model with robust standard errors and compare the estimates with
the estimates from firm fixed effects (F-test = 11.629, p < 0.001). Therefore, panel
28
data estimates are required. Next, using the Hausman test, we compare whether a
fixed effects or random effects model better corresponds to the data (p = 0.001; H0:
no difference in estimates between fixed and random effects). As the null hypothe-
ses is rejected random effects are not present, and therefore fixed effects estimations
are used. Next, we investigated whether the data exhibited heteroskedasticity or
autocorrelation. The autocorrelation component at AR(1), or dependent variable
lagged at t − 1, is significant (= 0.398, p = 0.000), however, AR(2) is not signif-
icant (= 0.113, p = 0.186); therefore, the AR(1) lag structure is used to model
the data. Furthermore, the Cook-Weisberg heteroskedasticity test was significant
(= 111.439, p = 0.000). To account for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in our
fixed effects model we use a Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) approach.
The estimators generated from FGLS approach have been shown to be consistent
and efficient (Woolridge, 2002). Specifically, we use the xtgls command in Stata
11, and include corr(ar1) to specify panel specific AR(1) correlation structure, and
panels(hetero) to specify the heteroskedastic error structure across panels.
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show the 16 models used to test the hypotheses. Model 1
only considers the effects of the control variables on firm performance. This model
indicates that firm size is positively related to ROA, indicating possible economies
of scope and scale available in large firms. Environmental complexity is negatively
related to performance, whereas firm age and environmental munificence are insignif-
icantly related to performance. Models 2 and 3 individually investigate the effects
of instability (β = −0.0139, p < 0.01) and unpredictability (β = −0.0189, p < 0.01),
indicating that each are associated with lower firm performance. Similarly, each of
the six moderating factors positively affect ROA (Models 4-9). All three measures
of operational scope (Models 4-6), and two of three measures of operational slack
(Models 7 and 8) are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, whereas
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Table 2.3: Fixed Effects Regression
Fixed FGLS Effects Regression with AR(1) structure 




Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Direct Effects (t–1)          





     
Geographic Scope 
  
  0.0099* 
(0.0041) 
    
Process Scope 
  
   0.0126* 
(0.0049) 

















   0.0105* 
(0.0046) 
 








































Two–way Moderation Effects          
          
Product Scope × Unpredictability 
[H1a]  
        
Geographic Scope × 
Unpredictability [H1b]  
        
Process Scope × Unpredictability 
[H1c]  
        
          
Capacity Slack × Instability [H2a]          
Inventory Slack × Instability 
[H2b]  
        
Supply Chain Slack× Instability 
[H2c]  
        
Controls (t–1)          








































































Firm Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





















375.959 380.297 384.412 389.845 389.118 388.613 390.174 388.508 388.472 
Chi–Square change in model  4.338 (1) * 5.115 (1) * 5.433 (1) * 4.706 (1) * 4.201 (1) * 5.762 (1) * 4.096(1) * 4.060 (1) * 
Model difference for Chi–square 
change 













(3) (9) minus (3) 
Notes. AR(1) structure, or lagged ROA modeled in the fixed effects regression.  
N=964 firms representing 8,473 firm–years from 1997 to 2007. ^ p < 0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
industry-adjusted cash-to-cash cycle (Model 9) is positively but only marginally re-
lated to ROA (β = 0.0085, p < 0.10). With significant effects of independent and
moderator variables established, we now move to interpret the main effects.
Hypothesis 1a proposes that broad product scope strengthens firm performance in
unpredictable markets and weakens firm performance in predictable markets, and is
supported in Model 10 (β = 0.0289, p < 0.05). The interactions in Figure 3 are based
on the effects of independent variables at one standard deviation above and below
the mean values of moderating variables. Figure 2.3(a) shows that with increasing
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Table 2.4: Fixed Effects Regression
 
Fixed FGLS Effects Regression with AR(1) structure 
 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Direct Effects (t–1)        
Operational Scope         




   0.0138* 
(0.0060) 
Geographic Scope  0.0097* 
(0.0040)  
   0.0086^ 
(0.0044) 
Process Scope   0.0125** 
(0.0047) 




























































Two–way Moderation Effects        
        






   0.0274* 
(0.0119) 




   0.0174^ 
(0.0079) 
Process Scope × Unpredictability 
[H1c] 
  0.0249* 
(0.0107) 
   0.0246* 
(0.0109) 
        






  0.01688 
(0.0085) 
















Controls (t–1)        
























































Firm Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 

















394.17 394.874 394.23 394.229 392.585 394.425 407.077 
Chi–Square change in model 
4.325 (1) * 5.756 (1) * 5.617 (1) * 4.055 (1) * 4.077 (1) * 5.953(1) * 
22.665 
(12)* 
















Notes. AR(1) structure, or lagged ROA modeled in the fixed effects regression.  
N=964 firms representing 8,473 firm–years from 1997 to 2007. ^ p < 0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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unpredictability, broader product scope increases firm performance, whereas narrower
product scope lowers firm performance. Similarly, Hypotheses 1(b) (Model 11: β =
0.0186, p < 0.05) and 1(c) are also supported (Model 12: β = 0.0249, p < 0.05). The
predictions are supported in Figure 2.3(b) for H1b and Figure 2.3(c) for H1c.
(a) Product Scope (b) Geographic Scope
(c) Process Scope
Figure 2.3: Moderation Effects of Operational Scope on Unpredictability
Hypothesis 2a, proposes that increased capacity slack in unstable markets im-
proves performance and higher capacity slack in stable markets lowers performance,
and is supported in Model 13 (β = 0.0179, p < 0.05). Figure 2.4(a) shows that
with increasing instability, more capacity slack improves performance. Similarly, Hy-
pothesis 2b concerning the role of inventory slack in unstable markets is supported
(Model 14: β = 0.092, p < 0.05). Figure 2.4(b) indicates that high inventory slack
under increasing instability does not significantly impact performance, but having
low inventory slack in unstable environment lowers performance. Finally, Hypothe-
sis 3c concerning the moderation effects of supply chain slack on performance under
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increasing instability are not supported (Model 15: β = 0.0077, p > 0.10).
(a) Capacity Slack (b) Inventory Slack
Figure 2.4: Moderation Effects of Operational Slack on instability
Robustness tests.
We conduct two sets of robustness tests. First, we assess whether non-linear re-
lationships are present between the moderator variables and firm performance. The
relationship between the squared terms of product (β = −0.0007, p > 0.10), geo-
graphic (β = −0.0004, p > 0.10), or process scope (β = −0.0004, p > 0.10) on firm
performance are not significant. The interaction effects between the squared terms
of product (β = −0.0002, p > 0.10), geographic (β = −0.0000, p > 0.10), or process
scope (β = −0.0001, p > 0.10) and unpredictability on firm performance are not
significant either.
The squared terms of capacity slack (β = −0.0003, p > 0.10), inventory slack
(β = −0.0007, p > 0.10), or supply chain slack (β = −0.0010, p > 0.10) are not
related to firm performance. Furthermore, the interaction effects of the squared terms
of capacity slack (β = −0.0000, p > 0.10), inventory slack (β = −0.0002, p > 0.10),
or supply chain slack (β = −0.0004, p > 0.10) and instability are not significant.
Second, we test for the alternate moderation effects of operational scope on insta-
bility and operational slack on unpredictability. The effects of operational scope and
instability (product scope: β = 0.0008, p > 0.10; geographic scope: β = 0.0007, p >
0.10; process scope: β = 0.0002, p > 0.10) or operational slack and unpredictability
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(capacity slack: β = 0.0003, p > 0.10; inventory slack: β = 0.0001, p > 0.10; supply
chain slack: β = 0.0000, p > 0.10) on performance are not significant.
2.5 Discussion
This paper investigates the role of operational levers (operational slack and opera-
tional scope) utilized by firms to manage their operations in dynamic business en-
vironments. By separately considering the effects of these two operational levers,
we can better understand their distinct roles in influencing the performance of firms
in unstable and unpredictable markets. When measured independently, we confirm
that increased operational slack and operational scope are both positively associated
with firm performance, whereas instability and unpredictability are both negatively
associated with firm performance. More importantly though, we find that broad
operational scope (operationalized as product scope, geographic scope, and process
scope) strengthens firm performance in unpredictable markets, whereas operational
slack (operationalized as capacity slack, inventory slack and supply chain slack) shows
mixed results for enhancing performance in unstable markets. Capacity and inven-
tory slack strengthen firm performance in unstable markets; however, these benefits
are not found from supply chain slack. This finding suggests that supply chain slack
does not accrue additional performance benefits in unstable compared to stable envi-
ronments. Additionally, our findings could not support the claims that “too much”
slack or “too broad” of a scope was detrimental.
The lack of support for these inverted U-shaped relationships could be attributed
to two factors. As noted by Daniel et al. (2004, p.572), “firmscould be operating
only on the positively sloped portion of the relationship”, implying that firms in our
study effectively manage the potentially detrimental consequences from excess slack
or scope. Additionally, our study compares a firm’s relative performance in its indus-
try while considering industry specific environmental conditions with respect to its
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relative amount of slack resources and breadth of scope (compared to other firms in
its industry). Dess et al. (1990, p.14) noted that “research concerned with relation-
ships between diversification strategy and performance demonstrates the potential
for misleading interpretations and alternative plausible explanations that can result
if researchers do not control for possible industry influences”, yet unfortunately “only
a small portion of diversification-performance studies [from prior literature] controlled
for such effects” (Palich et al., 2000, p.168). Lastly, through mis-specification tests,
our findings indicate that operational slack is ineffective in improving firm perfor-
mance in unpredictable markets and operational scope is ineffective in improving
firm performance in unstable markets. Overall, these findings imply that decisions
on investing in operational slack and broadening operational scope should be made
recognizing the environmental conditions of the firm.
These findings support prior research on the benefits of operational slack and op-
erational scope, but find industry specific environmental conditions for which these
benefits exist. Specifically, the arguments for lean operations are supported (Modi
and Mishra 2011), but only for firms in stable industries. We find that low levels
of slack resources (lean) are more beneficial than high levels of slack resources (not
lean) when firms participate in stable markets, indicating that lean operations for
firms in these markets may be a performance enhancing strategy. Conversely, low
levels of operational slack (lean) severely weaken firm performance in unstable mar-
kets compared to high levels of operational slack. This supports the safety stock
formulation from the EOQ model and provides additional insight into the industry
specific conditions influencing the performance benefits from lean operations. These
findings additionally support the beneficial role that operational slack plays in dy-
namic markets. While Azadegan and colleagues (2013) find that under increased
environmental dynamism, slack resources lower the likelihood of venture failure, we
extend their work by specifically examining operational slack resources’ association
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with firm performance in unstable and unpredictable markets, two components of en-
vironmental dynamism, while additionally controlling for environmental munificence
and complexity. Our study finds that operational slack is beneficial in unstable but
not unpredictable markets.
In examining the role of operational scope, our findings provide support that fo-
cused factories enhance firm performance, but only in predictable markets. When
markets are predictable, we find that firms that employ narrow operational scopes
outperform those with broader operational scopes. These findings extend the findings
of Anand and Ward (2004), with a main key difference in regards to product scope.
Whereas their study found no support for range flexibility (similar to product scope)
improving performance in unpredictable environments, we find that broad product
scopes enhance performance in unpredictable markets. We believe this difference may
be due to three possible, yet interrelated factors. First, the level of analyses in Anand
and Ward (2004) was at the plant level and focused on three industries (determined
by SIC codes), whereas this study is at the firm level including 23 different indus-
tries over a ten year period. Second, the measures for unpredictable markets and
range flexibility (product scope) are different between the studies. Anand and Ward
(2004) followed Bourgeois’ (1980) argument and used “managers’ perceptions” in de-
termining unpredictable markets and the importance of the plant’s ability to enhance
product scope. Thus, these perceived measures can differ between plants in the same
industry. In this study, the firm-level objective measure of unpredictable markets
does not vary across firms belonging to the same industry. Similarly, we examine
firms’ product portfolios to determine their product scope, which is measured as the
firm’s industry- adjusted product segment sales concentrations. Lastly, while Anand
and Ward investigate sales growth and increased market share as benefits from an
increased product scope in unpredictable markets, our performance measure (ROA)
considers the additional revenues as well as costs and assets required to establish and
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maintain a diverse product scope.
Findings from our study also suggest that if environmental instability and unpre-
dictability are not separately considered, the benefits from operational slack and op-
erational scope can be potentially overstated. Specifically, this study provides cues for
resource constrained managers who must determine how to best mitigate the poten-
tially negative consequences from unstable and unpredictable markets. Investments
in broadening operational scope for firms in stable markets or increasing operational
slack for firms in predictable markets may be misguided, as these costly investments
may actually diminish firm performance. Firms should pursue broader operational
scopes if they participate in unpredictable markets and increased operational slack if
they participate in unstable markets. These strategies mitigate the potentially nega-
tive consequences of not having enough slack or operational breadth as instability or
unpredictability increases. This stance implies managers should focus on broadening
their product offerings, geographical markets served, and ability to cost effectively
adjust production output if their anticipated future demand is difficult to predict, as
represented by the food and kindred products manufacturing industry (SIC 20) in this
analysis. Alternately, managers should attempt to ensure sufficient inventory levels
and excess production capacity to manage highly volatile demand, as represented by
the electrical equipment manufacturing industry (SIC 36). Firms operating in low
instability and low unpredictability industries are found to benefit from low levels
of slack (lean) and narrow operational scopes, respectively. The printing and pub-
lishing and the petroleum and gas industries (SIC 27 & 29) were each classified as
low instability and low unpredictability industries in this study. Investments into the
inappropriate operational strategy may place the firm at a competitive disadvantage
in their industry.
Limitations and Future Research
We acknowledge the limitations of our study. First, this study was focused on
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two operationally specific levers firms can utilize to manage dynamic environments
(breadth of operational scope and amount of operational slack), and was not con-
cerned with other organizational (staffing, sales expenditures, etc.) or financial (lever-
aging, debt structuring, etc.) strategies. Future work which considers these additional
strategies could provide managers with further guidance on how to best manage dy-
namic environments. Second, with respect to operational slack, this study indicates
that although lean operations are positively associated with firm performance in sta-
ble markets, being too lean may be ineffective in unpredictable markets. However,
we also recognize that this inference may be limited to the measures used to opera-
tionalize slack. We believe this study can serve as a starting point for future research
to further explore different conditions when certain measures of lean operations are
beneficial and vice-versa. Third, this paper identified environmental conditions that
support the concept of a focused factory as a contrasting operational strategy from
broad scopes. Further studies are required to determine what other firm, industry,
or environmentally specific attributes lead to the differences as to whether narrow or
broad operational scopes yields competitive advantage. Lastly, this study was focused
on the performance of publicly traded US firms, and as such these findings may not
generalize to foreign or privately managed firms. Future work is necessary to verify
that the relationships between operational strategies and dynamic environments of
non-US or privately held firms is consistent with those found in this study.
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CHAPTER III
SALES FORCE COMPENSATION FOR
REMANUFACTURED PRODUCTS
3.1 Introduction and Related Literature
Used goods find their way back into Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) facili-
ties for a variety of reasons, including strategic product recovery (Guide et al., 2003),
convenient return policies (Guide et al., 2006), false failure returns (Ferguson et al.,
2006), product demo returns (Guide et al., 2005), trade-ins (Ray et al., 2005), or
warranty requirements (Pince et al., 2012). Motivated by the residual value embed-
ded in these products, many firms from consumer goods manufacturers (e.g., Bosch
Tools, HP, and Apple) to industrial equipment manufacturers (e.g., Xerox, Cisco, and
Caterpillar) remanufacture1 and remarket used product returns.
Remanufacturing is prevalent in many industries and for a variety of products,
including disposable cameras (Kodak, 2008), ink cartridges (Kittell & Page, 2008),
motor vehicle components, aerospace equipment, and retreaded tires to name a few.
It is estimated that sales of remanufactured products increased by 15 percent between
2009 and 2011, which is twice the rate of nominal US GDP growth, to $43 billion
in the US (Treat et al., 2012). What makes remanufacturing an attractive business
opportunity is the relatively low cost of remanufacturing used products compared to
producing new ones. The lower costs associated with remanufacturing provide firms
with the opportunity to sell remanufactured products at lower prices, facilitating
1In this paper, remanufacturing is used in a broader sense to denote other forms of product
recovery activities such as refurbishing and reconditioning, which involve the process of repairing or
replacing portions of a used product in order to restore it to a like new condition.
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market expansion to lower budget consumers while generating relatively higher profit
margins from these products.
A firm’s decision to offer remanufactured products is essentially a product portfo-
lio problem: the firm needs to strategically price new and remanufactured products
so that profits can be maximized by enlarging the customer base with minimal canni-
balization of new product sales while benefiting from the lower costs associated with
remanufacturing. At the same time, the addition of remanufactured products into a
firm’s portfolio requires strategic choices regarding sales force management and com-
pensation practices. While there is substantial research investigating the pricing and
market segmentation aspects of remanufacturing (Majumder & Groenevelt, 2001; Fer-
rer & Swaminathan, 2006; Debo et al., 2005, 2006; Ferguson et al., 2006; Atasu et al.,
2008; Souza, 2013), this literature implicitly assumes that remanufactured products
need only to be redistributed into the supply chain, thereby ignoring the fact that
many products require active sales efforts to generate sales. We attempt to “close
the loop” by explicitly considering the implications of sales force incentives on the
practice of remanufacturing.
A natural starting point for an investigation of this problem is the marketing lit-
erature on sales force compensation, starting with Basu et al. (1985) who investigate
the optimal sales force compensation plan of a firm using a principal agent model.
However, optimal product pricing and sales force incentives for selling multiple prod-
ucts, whose demands and cost of selling effort may interact, have not been adequately
analyzed (Coughlan, 1993). Although there is some research on sales force incentives
for selling multiple products (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Lal & Srinivasan, 1993),
these papers do not consider optimal pricing and sales agent effort decisions simul-
taneously. Instead, they consider pricing to be exogenous and focus solely on the
effort allocation problem. Additionally, prior research does not consider the inter-
action between demands or costs of effort on each product; i.e., Lal and Srinivasan
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(1993) consider how to manage sales agents responsible for products that are sold in
different markets whose demands are independent. A notable exception to this point
is the analysis of substitutable and complementary products by Zhang and Mahajan
(1995). Zhang and Mahajan find that sales force incentives should be based on the
total sales of two products if they are substitutes, but only for the product which has
a higher productivity of selling effort if the two products are complements. None of
these prior approaches, however, adequately describe the product portfolio problem
faced in the remanufacturing context. This is due to the unique supply and demand
characteristics of remanufactured products.
Modeling demand for remanufactured products differs from traditional sales force
compensation models in two significant ways. First, new and remanufactured prod-
ucts are substitutes at the time of purchase, yet complements across time (Debo
et al., 2005). The availability of remanufactured products is limited by the quantity
of previously sold new products that are subsequently returned to the firm, implying
that new product sales are complements to remanufactured product sales. Yet, at
any point in time, customers may choose between new and remanufactured products,
thus making them also substitutes. Second, the perceived quality of remanufactured
products is typically discounted by consumers (Guide & Li, 2010; Michaud & Ller-
ena, 2011; Subramanian & Subramanyam, 2012; Hazen et al., 2012; Agrawal et al.,
2012). Accordingly, the existing literature that investigates sales force compensa-
tion for multiple products (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, Lal and Srinivasan
1993, and Zhang and Mahajan 1995) cannot adequately represent these unique char-
acteristics of the remanufacturing problem, because they neither capture the vertical
differentiation between new and remanufactured products, nor the supply dynamics
faced in this context.
Another key departure from prior literature is the possible variation in channel
configuration for remanufactured products. For this analysis, the terms sales channel
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and sales agent are used interchangeably, each representing the parties responsible
for dedicating sales effort to promote product valuations, thus increasing demand.
Two types of sales channel configurations are observed in the remanufacturing prac-
tice. Some firms utilize a joint sales channel to sell both new and remanufactured
products. For example, new and remanufactured products are available from Ap-
ple’s website or from Sony’s physical stores or website. Other firms utilize separate
channels for new and remanufactured products, as exemplified by Caterpillar creat-
ing the Cat Reman division in 2005 to separately manage the remanufacturing and
remarketing activities for Caterpillar. This variation can even be observed within a
firm across product categories. For example, while Bosch USA’s Automotive Tech-
nology division remanufactures and actively promotes both new and remanufactured
Bosch automotive parts, its Consumer Goods division remanufactures power tools
but does not actively promote them. Instead it relies on its distribution partners to
manage the promotion and sales of remanufactured products (Bosch, 2012a,b). Sim-
ilarly, Hewlett-Packard (HP) supports its B2B customers with remanufactured IT
equipment (enterprise servers) through its HP Renew program, but remanufactured
products for B2C customers (such as personal computers) are rarely offered by HP
(HP, 2012; Guide et al., 2005). Consequently, the pricing of and sales force compen-
sation plans for new and remanufactured products should be analyzed under both of
these channel configurations.
Another factor that requires attention is whether sales force efforts are as effective
in promoting remanufactured products as they are in promoting new products, for
which prior research does not provide any empirical evidence. Although new and
remanufactured products share the same functionality and product architecture, sales
force efforts may or may not have the same effectiveness in their promotions. The
ability to influence the demand for a product can be product dependent (Bagwell,
2007; Caves & Greene, 1996) or independent (Tremblay & Polasky, 2002; Colombo &
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Lambertini, 2003; Reichfeld & Teal, 1996). As such, sales force compensation plans
should be examined taking into consideration whether the effectiveness of the sales
force differs between new and remanufactured products.
Consequently, the main questions we address in this paper are: (i) How should
firms manage sales force incentives for new and remanufactured products? (ii) How
do these decisions differ under joint and separate channel configurations? (iii) How
does the sales person’s effectiveness in selling remanufactured products impact these
decisions? and (iv) How do sales force incentives influence a firm’s decision to offer
remanufactured products?
Our analysis indicates that firms should always offer higher commissions for the
sales of new products compared to remanufactured products, even when remanufac-
tured products offer higher profit margins, which contradicts some of the established
results in the existing literature; e.g., Lal and Srinivasan (1993). This relation holds
under both joint and separate sales channels, irrespective of the effectiveness of sales
efforts for remanufactured products as compared to new products. Lastly, sales force
incentives may create situations where seemingly optimal remanufacturing practices
should actually not be undertaken, since the costs associated with promoting both
new and remanufactured products in the market may exceed the benefits from re-
manufactured products’ cost savings, even when the costs of remanufacturing are
negligible.
In what follows, an analytical model that builds on traditional sales force com-
pensation and remanufacturing literature is described in §3.2. In §3.3, we analyze
a scenario without sales force incentives to benchmark our results with those in the
existing literature. In §3.4, we provide a detailed analysis of our model. In §3.5, we
provide some extensions to the model to verify the robustness of the results. We con-
clude in §3.6 by summarizing our managerial insights and contributions to literature,
and discussing additional avenues for research.
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3.2 Model Setup
We consider a principal (the firm) who decides on the prices and compensation
schemes for new and remanufactured products. Sales agents hired by the firm are
responsible for promoting and selling new and remanufactured products. Based on
the product pricing and compensation scheme, sales agents determine how much ef-
fort (ti) to devote specifically to product type i’s selling activity, where i ∈ {N,R}
denotes the product type as new (N) or remanufactured (R). The customers then
make their purchasing decisions based on the product price and effort exerted by the
salesperson in promoting the product.
The Demand: To model the demand in the remanufacturing context, we combine
the multi-product model of Lal and Srinivasan (1993) with the established supply
and demand assumptions in the remanufacturing literature (Majumder & Groen-
evelt, 2001; Ferrer & Swaminathan, 2006; Debo et al., 2005, 2006; Ferguson et al.,
2006; Atasu et al., 2008), which borrow traditional assumptions from the durable
goods literature (Stokey, 1981; Bulow, 1982; Desai & Purohit, 1998; Waldman, 1993).
We model the demand for new and remanufactured products considering a verti-
cally differentiated market with heterogeneous customers who have lower valuations
for remanufactured products. The customer’s utility is assumed to be of the form
u (νi, ti, pi) = θνi + γiti − pi from purchasing and using product i, where pi is the
product price, ti the effort exerted by the salesperson on selling activities for prod-
uct i, γi the effectiveness of the salesperson’s activities in promoting product i, and
θνi the heterogeneous customer’s valuation for product i absent a sales force where
θ ∼ U [0, 1]. While previous literature has considered the effects from sales agent
effort to have either multiplicative (Rao, 1990; Taylor, 2002) or additive (Chen, 2000;
Cachon & Lariviere, 2005; Caldieraro & Coughlan, 2007) influence on customer util-
ity, we specifically consider an additive model, as this is a more manageable approach
when considering the demands for multiple products (Joseph & Thevaranjan, 1998;
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Tsay & Agrawal, 2000). The salesperson’s efforts effectively improve the customer’s
perceived valuation of a product, which thereby increases their overall utility should
they choose to purchase the product.
We normalize the valuation of new products νN to 1 and assume that customers
discount the value of remanufactured products by a discount factor δ; i.e., νR =
δνN = δ which represents the perceived quality difference between new and remanu-
factured products (Guide & Li, 2010; Michaud & Llerena, 2011; Subramanian & Sub-
ramanyam, 2012; Hazen et al., 2012; Agrawal et al., 2012). Hence, a customer’s utility
for new and remanufactured products can be written as uN = θ+γN tN−pN and uR =
δθ+ γRtR− pR, respectively. The demands for new and remanufactured products are
obtained by the aggregation of all customers satisfying two conditions: 1) customers
receive a non-negative utility from the product, i.e., u (vi, pi, ti) ≥ 0; and 2) the utility
from one product exceeds that from the other product u (νi, pi, ti) ≥ u (ν−i, p−i, t−i).
The demand for new products is given by 1 − θ̂u where θ̂u solves for the marginal
customer u (νN , pN , tN) = u (νR, pR, tR), i.e., θ̂u =
(pN−pR)−(γN tN−γRtR)
1−δ . Hence, the
quantity of new products sold is given by qN = 1− (pN−pR)−(γN tN−γRtR)1−δ . The quantity
of remanufactured products sold is given by qR = θ̂u−θ̂l where θ̂l solves u (pR, tR) = 0.
Simplifying, we get θ̂l =
pR−γRtR
δ
, which results in qR =
δpN−pR−(δγN tN−γRtR)
δ(1−δ) .
The Agents: The firm designs a compensation plan that incentivizes the sales agents
to dedicate time to selling activities in such a way as to maximize firm profits. We
restrict our attention to linear contracts following Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)
who show that when an agent chooses efforts continuously over time and can observe
her cumulative performance before acting, the efficient wage contract is linear in the
total output (sales) over the accounting period, even if the firm can base the sales
agent’s compensation on the sales history over the entire accounting period. We define
this linear wage contract as si(qi) = Ai+Biqi for sales agents in separate channels and
s{N,R}(qN , qR) = A+BNqN +BRqR for sales agents in a joint channel, where Ai is the
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fixed wage component of the compensation and Bi the sales commission on product
i ∈ {N,R}. The sales agent’s utility can therefore be represented by the combination
of her wage contract and disutility from effort of the form: U(ti) = si(qi)−V (ti) ≥ w0;
where V (ti) and w0 represent the agent’s disutility from effort and reservation wage,
respectively.
We assume that the sales agents have homogeneous capabilities (they have iden-
tical costs of effort and are equally effective in promoting identical products) (Rao,
1990; Misra et al., 2013), but consider the possibility that the salesperson’s influence
on a customer’s purchasing decision for a remanufactured product may be different
than that for a new product. Specifically, we consider that the sales efforts’ effec-
tiveness in increasing a customer’s valuation of a product may be either dependent
or independent of the product type. Additionally, without loss of generality, we set
γN = 1, such that differences in γR represent the differences in sales effort effectiveness
between the two products. Along these lines, we consider two distinct interpretations
for the relationships between γi and νi, which are theoretically grounded and high-
light the influence that sales effort effectiveness has on the sales agent’s actions, and
subsequently, the firm’s remanufacturing strategy.
First, the effectiveness of a sales agent’s selling activities can be independent of the
product type and increase customer’s valuation (thus utility) the same way for both
new and remanufactured products. This overall increase in utility can be attributed
to customer specific activities such as relationship building or maintenance that the
salesperson is able to cultivate. In this context, the salesperson performs a more
general function than the one specifically attributed to the product by providing
services that help the customer in ways independent from the specific valuation of
the product (Reichfeld & Teal, 1996; Tsay & Agrawal, 2000; Tremblay & Polasky,
2002). We represent this interpretation in our utility model by setting γN = γR = 1,
while noting that for any γR > 0 which is independent from the product valuation,
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the insights from this analysis remain unchanged2. We refer to this interpretation as
product independent sales efforts.
With the second interpretation, the effectiveness of sales agents’ selling activities
can be dependent on the product type. This would be the case when the sales agent’s
selling activities could be “value enhancing”, such that selling activities persuade the
customer to purchase specific products (Bagwell, 2007; Caves & Greene, 1996). This
interpretation can be modeled by assuming that a customer’s valuation of a product
is given by ψi = (θ + ti)νi translating into a utility of u (ψi, pi) = ψi − pi, which
indicates that the effectiveness of the sales effort depends on the product type. This
interpretation can be represented in our utility model by setting γN = 1, and γR = δ.
We refer to this interpretation as product dependent sales efforts.
Costs: The salesperson decides on the amount of effort (tN , tR) to dedicate to the
selling activities for new and remanufactured products. Following Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1987), we assume the sales agent’s cost of effort for selling activities is




2 for i ∈ {N,R} for sales agents in separate channels and





R) − µtN tR for sales agents in joint sales channels,
where µ represents the synergy in sales effort between the two products. We ini-
tially assume there is no synergy in sales effort (µ = 0), but relax this assumption in
§5. Furthermore, we assume a constant marginal production cost for new products
cN > 0, while the cost of remanufacturing cR is negligible and set to 0; i.e., cN can
be interpreted as the cost savings from remanufacturing. This assumption allows us
to focus on instances where remanufacturing is profitable for a firm in the absence of
a sales force.
Supply Dynamics: Following a well established stream in the remanufacturing liter-
ature (Majumder and Groenevelt 2001, Debo et al. 2005, Ferguson and Toktay 2006,
2Results available from the authors but omitted for brevity.
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Ferrer and Swaminathan 2006, Atasu et al. 2008b), we assume that new and reman-
ufactured products have a useful lifetime of one period. Previously sold products can
be recovered and remanufactured, but only once. Furthermore, in every period, the
quantity of remanufactured products that can be sold is constrained by the supply
of used products, which is equal to some fraction of the quantity of new products
sold in the previous period. It can be shown that an infinite horizon dynamic for-
mulation setting of this problem reduces to a steady state model if the compensation
plan is established first and pricing is optimized every period (see Agrawal et. al
2011). Accordingly, we focus our analysis on a steady-state, single-period model such
that qR ≤ αqN , where α ∈ (0, 1) represents the fraction of used products available to
the firm for remanufacturing. In other words, if qN new products are sold in steady
state, a maximum of αqN products can be remanufactured and sold. Without loss
of generality, for the subsequent analysis we set α = 1, indicating that all previously
sold product can be returned to the firm for remanufacturing3. We denote this as
the remanufacturing supply constraint (RS), which allows us to maintain the depen-
dence between new and remanufactured product sales in a single-period, steady-state
formulation.
The Firm’s Problem: The firm determines the optimal pricing and compensation
structure to maximize its profits by solving equation (3.1) as follows (assuming sep-
arate sales channels):
max
pN ,pR,AN ,AR,BN ,BR
Π = (pN − cN)qN + pRqR − sN(qN)− sR(qR) (3.1)




U(ti) ∀ i ∈ {N,R} (IC)
qR ≤ qN (RS)
3For any α ∈ (0, 1), the insights from this analysis continue to hold, therefore setting α = 1 is
not a limiting assumption. Results for this analysis are available from the authors but omitted for
brevity.
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qR + qN ≤ 1 (MC)
{ti, qi, Bi} ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ {N,R} (NN)
Here, the individual rationality constraint (IR) ensures that the sales agents will
accept the compensation contract offered by the firm only if they are guaranteed a
minimum wage (w0), which we normalize to 0
4. The incentive compatibility con-
straint (IC) indicates that the sales agents choose their effort level to maximize their
utility. The remanufacturing supply constraint (RS) ensures the balance between the
available supply and demand for remanufactured products. Additionally, we ensure
that the total sales of new and remanufactured products does not exceed the over-
all market demand with the market capacity constraint (MC), and that all prices,
efforts, quantities, and commissions are non-negative in equilibrium. We normalize
the total number of potential customers in the market to one. Since sales agents
can increase customers’ valuations of products, the MC constraint guarantees that
the actual number of products sold does not exceed the number of consumers in the
market. For the model analysis in §3.3 and §3.4, we consider that the demands for
new and remanufactured products are deterministic. This assumption is relaxed in
§3.5 to verify that demand uncertainty does not alter our insights.
3.3 Benchmark: A Model without Sales Force Effects
In this section, we provide a benchmark analysis in the absence of a sales force to
represent the implications of prior research on remanufacturing, where product pricing
has been the only mechanism to drive demand. This benchmark will serve to highlight
the implications of sales force incentives on remanufacturing. To exclude the influence
of the sales force on demand, we set BR = 0 and BN = 0. In this setting, the firm
4It is straightforward to show that the commissions BN and BR are independent of w0, and w0
linearly modifies AN and AR in a one to one fashion; therefore, setting w0 = 0 does not alter the
insights from the model.
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solves equation (3.2) as follows:
max
pN ,pR
Π = (pN − cN)qN + pRqR (3.2)
s.t. qR ≤ qN (RS)
qR + qN ≤ 1 (MC)
qR ≥ 0 (NN)
The optimal solution in the absence of a sales force consists of two distinct pricing
strategies for the firm, depending on the relationship between δ and cN . We denote
these policies as Full Remanufacturing (FR) and Limited Remanufacturing (LR).
For large cN , the FR policy is optimal such that the remanufacturing supply con-
straint is binding. In this region, the firm finds it optimal to maximize the sales of
remanufactured products, which results in balanced sales of new and remanufactured
products (due to the RS constraint) such that qR
∗ = qN
∗. For small cN , the LR pol-
icy is optimal, such that qR
∗ < qN
∗. The firm will not completely cover the market
in either of these policies (i.e., the MC constraint is never binding). Proposition 3.1
and Table 3.1 define these policies, which are illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Proposition 3.1. In the absence of a sales force, there exists a unique optimal so-
lution to the the firm’s problem. When cN >
1−δ
2
the FR policy is optimal, whereas
when cN ≤ 1−δ2 the LR policy is optimal. The equilibrium solution is characterized
in Table 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Optimal Policy Without a Sales Force
A key observation in this setting is that in the absence of a sales force, the firm
always finds it optimal to sell remanufactured products alongside new products in the
same market. This result is consistent in principle with previous research in that if
the cost for remanufacturing is sufficiently low (note that we assume cR = 0), then it
is always optimal for a firm to sell remanufactured products concurrently with new
products in the market (Debo et al., 2005; Ferrer & Swaminathan, 2006; Atasu et al.,
2008; Majumder & Groenevelt, 2001; Ferguson & Toktay, 2006).
3.4 Remanufacturing with a Sales Force
In this section, we analyze the optimal pricing of new and remanufactured products
in the presence of a sales force that is offered an optimal compensation. We first
examine the optimal policy for a firm that employs separate sales agents for new
and remanufactured products. Then, we explore the optimal policy for a firm that
employs a single sales agent to sell both new and remanufactured products in the
same market. We then compare these solutions to the benchmark case provided in
§3.3 to generate insights.
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3.4.1 Separate Sales Channels for New and Remanufactured Products
In this setting, each channel is responsible for the sales activities of either new or
remanufactured products, and each sales agent is offered a linear compensation scheme
of the form: si(qi) = Ai + Biqi, where i ∈ {N,R}. The firm’s decision problem is
formally written in equation (3.1).
3.4.1.1 Separate Channels with Product Dependent Sales Effort Effectiveness.
We first examine the optimal policy for a firm when the effectiveness of the sales efforts
are dependent on the product type, i.e., when the sales effort to induce demand for the
remanufactured product is less effective than the same for the new product (γR = δ).
In this scenario, the optimal portfolio choice concerning new and remanufactured
products takes the form of one of three strategies: No Remanufacturing (NR), Full
Remanufacturing (FR), and Limited Remanufacturing (LR). This characterization
of the optimal solution is outlined in Proposition 3.2 and Table 3.2, and illustrated
in Figure 3.2. The analytical reasoning behind this partitioning of the solution space
is driven by the remanufacturing supply and non-negativity constraints. For this
scenario, theMC constraint is never binding at the optimal solution, i.e., the market is
never fully covered. When the NN constraint is binding, the NR strategy is optimal,
and when the RS constraint is binding, the FR strategy is optimal. Otherwise, i.e.,
when no constraints are binding, the LR strategy is optimal. Similar to Proposition
3.1 from the benchmark case without sales agents, Proposition 3.2 indicates that the
FR policy is optimal when cN is high. For intermediate values of cN and low δ, the
LR policy is optimal.
Proposition 3.2. There exists a unique solution to the firm’s problem with separate
sales channels and product dependent sales effort effectiveness (γR = δ). When cN >
3δ−3







δ−6 and δ >
2
5
, the FR policy is optimal; when
1
2
≤ cN ≤ 3δ−3δ−4 and δ ≤
2
5




or cN ≤ δ−5+
√
1+6δ−δ2
δ−6 and δ >
2
5
, the NR policy is optimal. The equilibrium solution
is characterized in Table 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Optimal Policy with Product Dependent Separate Sales Channel Efforts
A critical observation in Figure 3.2 is immediate after a comparison with Figure
3.1. While selling remanufactured products is always optimal in the absence of a
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sales force, the same is not true with a sales force. The firm now finds that for low
cN , the NR strategy is optimal. There are two drivers of this result: (i) when cN
is low, the margin advantage from remanufactured products is low, and (ii) product
dependent sales force activities are more effective for new products than for reman-
ufactured products. Accordingly, in this region (where cN is low), the firm prefers
to incentivize sales activities for new products more than those for remanufactured
products and may choose not to offer remanufactured products at all. Essentially,
inside the NR policy region, the sales force incentives required to guarantee that
both new and remanufactured products can co-exist in the market results in lower
firm profits than can be achieved by focusing all sales efforts on new products (and
none on remanufactured products). An implication of this result is that the existing
literature on remanufacturing may overestimate the profitability of remanufacturing;
i.e., ignoring sales force incentives may imply profitable remanufacturing even when
it is suboptimal to do so. This indicates that prior research that only considers pricing
decisions in the absence of a sales force may overestimate the benefits from reman-
ufacturing. Specifically, Proposition 2 from Debo et al. (2005), Theorem 1 from
Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006), Proposition 1 from Ferguson and Toktay (2006),
and Propositions 1 & 2 from Atasu et al. (2008) are not robust when a sales force is
utilized to promote and sell products.




Corollary 3.1 states a key insight: The new product sales agent should always
receive a larger sales commission than the remanufactured product sales agent. The
intuition behind this result is two sided: With low δ, not only is the valuation for
remanufactured products discounted, but also the product dependent sales force ef-
forts for remanufactured products are ineffective. Intuition therefore suggests that
the firm provide higher incentives for new product sales. This is in line with Lal and
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Srinivasan’s (1993) Proposition 3, which indicates that commission rates should be
higher for products that have a higher sales-effort effectiveness. Additionally, this
result holds for any δ, as the product dependent sales efforts for new products are
always more effective than those for remanufactured products.
Surprisingly, this ordering of commissions persists for all values of cN , which con-
tradicts Lal and Srinivasan’s (1993) Proposition 2, which suggests that higher com-
mission rates should be given for products with lower costs (i.e., higher margins). In
this model, cR = 0, such that the profit margins for remanufactured products are




= 1. Therefore, it is
surprising that the commissions for new products are always higher, even when they
return a significantly lower marginal profit than remanufactured products. This dis-
crepancy can be explained by two factors: the endogenous optimal pricing decisions
from the firm, and the implications of the remanufacturing supply constraint.
pN < pR
pN > pR
H1 - d L H1 + 7 d L
1 + 7 d - 2 d
2









Figure 3.3: Per Unit Product Profits with Product Dependent Separate Sales Chan-
nel Efforts
Whereas Lal and Srinivasan (1993) consider exogenous prices such that profit
margins for each product are only dependent on costs, we optimize product prices
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along with sales agent effort. Here, a mere cost comparison is not sufficient to com-
pare the profitability of the two products in our portfolio. Accordingly, we turn
our attention to per unit profits to explain the intuition behind our results. Figure
3.3 compares the per unit profits for new and remanufactured products for a firm
that utilizes separate sales channels with product dependent sales efforts. We define
πi = pi
∗ − ci for i ∈ {N,R} as the per unit profit for new and remanufactured prod-
ucts. As can be seen from Figure 3.3, when a firm finds it optimal to participate in
remanufacturing (the non-shaded region where the FR or LR policy is optimal), if
cN <
(1−δ)(1+7δ)
1+7δ−2δ2 then πN > πR. Under these conditions, the firm makes higher per
unit profits from the sales of new products than remanufactured products, and there-
fore having BN
∗ > BR
∗ is understandable, as the firm wishes to compensate more
for the sales of the more profitable product. However, when cN ≥ (1−δ)(1+7δ)1+7δ−2δ2 then
πN < πR, indicating that remanufactured products yield higher per unit profits than
new products. Under these conditions, the firm would like to maximize the sales of
remanufactured products to capitalize from their higher profits. However, the depen-
dence of the remanufactured product’s supply on previously sold new products limits
the firm’s ability to sell remanufactured products. Increasing the sales commissions
for remanufactured products leads to a higher cannibalization of new product demand,
thus reducing the supply of remanufactured products to be obtained from previously
sold new products. Accordingly, even when remanufactured products provide much
higher per unit profits, sales commissions should be higher for new products.
Furthermore, when the firm finds the FR or LR policy optimal such that it
participates in remanufacturing, the per unit profits from remanufactured products









. This implies that when the firm determines the optimal
product pricing and sales agent commissions (thus sales agent effort), as customer’s
willingness to pay for remanufactured products (δ) or the cost of new products (cN)
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increases, then the per product profits from remanufactured products increases at a
faster rate compared to those for new products, thus making remanufacturing even
more desirable for the firm; albeit, this opportunity is limited by the availability of
supplies.
3.4.1.2 Separate Channels with Product Independent Sales Effort Effectiveness.
We next investigate the robustness of the previous insights for separate sales channels
with product independent sales efforts; i.e., sales efforts are equally effective in in-
creasing customers’ valuations (thus demand) for new and remanufactured products
(γR = 1).
Similar to the previous analysis, depending on the relationship between δ and cN ,
the optimal portfolio composition of new and remanufactured products involves one of
three strategies for the firm in this scenario. These strategies are No Remanufacturing
(NR), Full Remanufacturing with Market Coverage (FC), and Full Remanufactur-
ing (FR). This characterization of the optimal solution is outlined in Proposition
3.3 and Table 3.3, and illustrated in Figure 3.4. Similar to the previous scenario,
this partitioning of the solution space is driven by the remanufacturing supply and
non-negativity constraints. When the NN constraint is binding, the NR strategy is
optimal. When the RS constraint is binding, the FR strategy is optimal. A crit-
ical difference between these results and those with product dependent sales efforts
however, is that the MC constraint can become binding for product independent
sales force efforts, as the benefits from the sales agents’ efforts are independent from
the product type. In this case, the FC policy may become optimal, where the sales
agent’s efforts (tR) can mitigate (and overcome) the detrimental consequences from
the customer’s discounted valuation for remanufactured products (δ) on the utility
customer’s receive from remanufactured products (and thus demand). The FC policy
is comparable to the FR policy in the sense that the firm wishes to maximize the
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sales of remanufactured products and thus balances the sales of remanufactured and
new products; i.e. qR
∗ = qN
∗. However, whereas the FR policy results in partial
market coverage, the FC policy completely covers the market.
Proposition 3.3. There exists a unique solution to the firm’s problem with separate
channels with product independent sales effort effectiveness (γR = 1). When cN >
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, the NR policy is optimal. The
equilibrium solution is characterized in Table 3.3.


















































Figure 3.4 illustrates the partitioning of the feasible landscape for this scenario.
Similar to the product dependent sales effort scenario, for product independent sales
efforts, the NR policy is optimal for low cN . Along with the analysis in §3.4.1.1, this
result confirms that sales force incentives can create situations where a firm finds it
optimal to not participate in the remanufactured product market, despite the beneficial














Figure 3.4: Optimal Policy with Product Independent Separate Sales Channel Ef-
forts
In this scenario, when the firm finds it optimal to sell remanufactured products
(i.e., inside the FR and FC policy regions), the commissions are set such that the sales
agents dedicate equal effort towards new and remanufactured products and the firm
adjusts pricing to maximize remanufactured product sales; i.e., tN
∗ = tR
∗. Moreover,
given any δ or cN , the new product price under the FR policy is higher than the new
product price under the FC policy, while the sales agents exert more effort for both
products in the FC policy than the FR policy.
Note that the FC policy was never optimal with product dependent sales efforts,
as the product dependent sales activities for remanufactured products are largely
ineffective when δ is low. However, when the sales efforts are product independent
(γN = γR = 1), it is optimal for the firm to induce higher sales efforts to increase the
total sales volume. The existence of this region where the FC policy is optimal is a key
difference between product dependent and product independent sales activities. It is
also interesting to note that as δ increases under the FC policy, firm profits decrease.
This means that if the firm finds it optimal to completely cover the market with a
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balance of new and remanufactured product sales, an increase in customers’ valuation
of remanufactured products diminishes firm profits. This counter-intuitive finding
is due to the unique supply constraint faced in the remanufacturing context. The
firm cannot sell more remanufactured products than new products and the market
is already covered such that no more product can be sold. Therefore, if δ increases
while the firm is operating under the FC policy, the firm is forced to reduce the
pricing of new products to ensure that there is enough supply of remanufactured
products. Consequently, this reduction in new product price in an effort to maintain
a sufficiently large supply of remanufacturable products results in lower profits from
new products, while maintaining constant profits from remanufactured products, thus
resulting in lower overall firm profits.




Corollary 3.2 states that the key insight from Corollary 3.1 continues to hold when
sales efforts are independent of the product type. In other words, the new product sales
agent should receive a larger commission for sales than the remanufactured product
sales agent, even when the sales force effectiveness is product independent.
As was the case with product dependent sales efforts, since we assume a negligible
cost for remanufacturing (cR = 0), the profit margins for new products are always
less than those for remanufactured products. Again though, the per product profits
and the RS constraint must be considered to understand the ordering of BN
∗ > BR
∗.
Figure 3.5 indicates the ordering of per product profits for new and remanufactured
products with product independent separate sales channel efforts (γN = γR = 1).
Similar to Figure 3.3, when the firm determines that it is optimal to participate in
remanufacturing and δ and cN are both low, new products yield a higher per product
profit than remanufactured products. This area is indicated by πN > πR in Figure
3.5, where cN <
1−δ
2
inside the FC region and cN <
1−6δ+5δ2
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Figure 3.5: Per Unit Product Profits with Product Independent Separate Sales
Channel Efforts
Therefore, it makes sense that the commissions for new products should be higher
than those for remanufactured products under these conditions. However, when δ
and/or cN are high, remanufactured products yield higher per product profits than
new products; i.e., πN < πR. This area is indicated by πN < πR in Figure 3.5, where
cN ≥ 1−δ2 inside the FC region and cN ≥
1−6δ+5δ2
1−7δ inside the FR region. Despite
the higher per unit profits for remanufactured products in this region, in order to
ensure a sufficient supply of remanufactured products, the commissions for (previously
sold) new product sales must be higher than those for remanufactured product sales.
The insights from §3.4.1.1 continue to hold as well, when the firm participates in
remanufacturing, per unit profits from remanufactured products increase faster than
those from new products as δ and cN increase; i.e., remanufacturing becomes more
attractive as δ or cN increase.
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3.4.1.3 The Impact of Sales Force Effectiveness with Separate Channels.
Next, we illustrate the impact of the sales force effectiveness (product dependent or
product independent) on the firm’s participation in remanufacturing when separate
channels are utilized for new and remanufactured products. Figure 3.6 compares the
optimal policies between product dependent and product independent sales efforts;
i.e., γR = δ and γR = 1.
NR optimal for 
ΓR = ∆,
but not for 
ΓR = 1









Figure 3.6: Expanded NR Region with Product Dependent Sales Efforts
As can be seen in Figure 3.6, remanufacturing is consistently optimal when cN
is high, such that irrespective of the effectiveness of sales agent’s efforts, when there
is a substantial marginal cost benefit from remanufactured products, the firm will
always find it optimal to maximize the quantity of remanufactured products it can
sell. However, as evident by the regions where the NR policy is optimal, for product
dependent sales effort effectiveness, the firm is more likely to not participate in the
sales of remanufactured products. Irrespective of how sales efforts increase demand,
when the marginal benefits from remanufacturing are low (i.e. low cN), the firm will
find it optimal to not participate in remanufactured product sales as their presence
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in the market would cannibalize the sales of new products. When sales force effort
effectiveness is product dependent instead of product independent, this increases the
lower limit on cN for which the firm would elect to not participate in remanufactured
product sales. The influence of sales agents’ effort effectiveness on the sub-optimality
of remanufacturing is formally stated by Corollary 3.3 and illustrated in Figure 3.6,
where the grey area characterizes the parameter range for which product dependent
sales efforts (γR = δ) favor the NR policy, but product independent sales efforts
(γR = 1) do not. For ease of notation, we will define the set of all (δ, cN) ∈ NR|γR=1
as ΩγR=1NR and the set of all (δ, cN) ∈ NR|γR=δ as Ω
γR=δ
NR . Similarly, we define the set
of all (δ, cN) ∈ FR|γR=1 as Ω
γR=1
FR and the set of all (δ, cN) ∈ FR|γR=δ as Ω
γR=δ
FR . From
this notation, the gray area in Figure 3.6 can be stated as ΩγR=δNR \ Ω
γR=1
NR .
Corollary 3.3. For separate sales channels, ΩγR=1NR ⊂ Ω
γR=δ
NR . Moreover, the area
ΩγR=δNR \ Ω
γR=1
NR gets smaller in δ.




∗ is larger with product independent sales efforts compared to prod-
uct dependent sales efforts.
Corollary 3.4 on the other hand, focuses on conditions where the firm finds it
optimal to offer remanufactured products, and indicates that when sales efforts are
product dependent, the commissions offered for both new and remanufactured prod-
uct sales are decreased compared to those offered when the sales efforts are product
independent. As a result of this discounted commission structure, the time that either
sales agent spends promoting product is less when the effectiveness of selling activities
are product dependent as opposed to product independent. As a direct consequence
of this, not only the remanufactured product volume, but also the total volume of
products sold under the FR policy is lower when the sales effort effectiveness is prod-
uct dependent. Specifically, tN
∗|γR=δ < tN ∗|γR=1 and tR∗|γR=δ < tR∗|γR=1, resulting in
qN
∗|γR=δ < qN ∗|γR=1 and qR∗|γR=δ < qR∗|γR=1.
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3.4.2 Joint Sales Channel for New and Remanufactured Products
Differing from the separate sales channel configuration in §3.4.1, firms may elect to
manage the sales of new and remanufactured product in a joint channel. The firm
must therefore determine the compensation scheme for the joint sales channel agent
as well as the pricing for the new and remanufactured products. The sales agent will
be offered a compensations scheme of the following form: s(qN , qR) = s(qN) + s(qR).
We can further combine the two fixed wage portions of the compensation scheme
into one since there is only one sales agent such that AN + AR = A. This results in
s(qN , qR) = A+BNqN +BRqR. The firm’s decision problem can be formally written
as in equation (1), with sN(qN) + sR(qR) replaced with s(qN , qR) for the joint channel
sales agent’s compensation, who will additionally determine her optimal sales efforts
for both the new and remanufactured products (tN
∗ and tR
∗).
3.4.2.1 Joint Channel with Product Dependent Sales Effort Effectiveness.
As before, we first examine the optimal policies for a firm utilizing a joint sales
channel for new and remanufactured products, with product dependent sales effort
effectiveness.
Proposition 3.4. There exists a unique solution to the firm’s problem with a joint
sales channel with product dependent sales effort effectiveness (γR = δ), which results
in identical policies to those identified with separate sales channels. When cN >
3δ−3
δ−4






δ−6 and δ >
2
5
, the FR policy is optimal; when 1
2
≤
cN ≤ 3δ−3δ−4 and δ ≤
2
5







δ−6 and δ >
2
5
, the NR policy is optimal. The equilibrium solution is
characterized in Table 3.4.
Proposition 3.4 states that the optimal remanufacturing policies of the firm em-
ploying a joint channel sales agent can be partitioned for all (δ, cN) identically to
the firm that employs separate channels for new and remanufactured products. In
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other words, the result that sales force incentives may render remanufacturing unde-
sirable remains valid in a joint channel. Comparing Table 3.4 to Table 3.2 reveals
that equal prices, efforts, and quantities sold for new and remanufactured products
can be achieved from either channel configuration for product dependent sales efforts.
On the other hand, the optimal sales commission structure is significantly different
between the two channel configurations. This implies that while joint and separate
channels can incorporate identical remanufacturing policies by utilizing linear pay-
ment schemes to compensate their sales agents, the commissions offered differ between
the channel configurations.




Furthermore, Corollary 3.5 states that the key result regarding a comparison be-
tween new and remanufactured product sales commissions continues to hold under
the joint channel, even though the commission structures are different. This is again
the result of the per product profits (as determined through optimal product pric-
ing) and the remanufacturing supply constraint. Additionally, these results for the
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commissions in a joint sales channel do not conform with the results from Zhang
and Mahajan (1995). Remanufactured products are substitutes at any point in time
to new products, but complements across time since their supply is dependent on
previously sold new products. Therefore, when firms participate in remanufacturing,
different commissions must be offered for new and remanufactured products due to
the unique supply and demand relationship they have.
3.4.2.2 Joint Channel with Product Independent Sales Effort Effectiveness.
We next investigate the robustness of the previous insights for a joint sales channel
with product independent sales efforts.
Proposition 3.5. There exists a unique solution to the firm’s problem with a joint
sales channel with product independent sales effort effectiveness (γR = 1), which
results in identical policies to those identified with separate sales channels. When
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and δ ≤ 3
8
or cN ≤ 1−5δ+δ
√
6δ
1−6δ and δ >
3
8
, the NR policy is optimal.
The equilibrium solution is characterized in Table 3.5.
Proposition 3.5 states that the equivalence between the remanufacturing policies
under joint and separate channels continue to hold under the product independent
sales force efforts assumption, implying that the result that sales force incentives may
render remanufacturing undesirable is robust to the channel setting and sales force
effectiveness.




Along similar lines, Corollary 3.6 shows the robustness of our result regarding the
comparison between optimal sales commissions for new and remanufactured products
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and allows us to formalize an important conclusion. Under any channel configura-
tion (joint or separate), and sales force effectiveness (product dependent or product
independent), sales commissions should be higher for new products.




∗ is larger with product independent sales efforts compared to product dependent
sales efforts.
Corollary 3.7 is analogous to Corollary 3.4, indicating that in a joint sales chan-
nel, commissions with independent sales efforts are higher than those for product
dependent sales efforts for both new and remanufactured products.
3.4.3 A Comparison of Commissions Across Joint and Separate Sales
Channels
Recognizing a firm can choose a joint or separate sales channels for a variety of
reasons5, our study is concerned with how the compensation structures may differ
5In our deterministic setting, it is straightforward to show that the firm can achieve the first
best optimal solution in the absence of demand uncertainty with risk neutral agents under both
joint and separate sales channels (Laffont & Martimort, 2001). When other contextual factors, such
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between the two channel structures. As such, Corollary 3.9 follows:
Corollary 3.8. For all (δ, cN), γR ∈ {δ, 1}, and i ∈ {N,R} : Bi∗ for a separate sales
channel is less than Bi
∗ for a joint sales channel.
Corollary 3.8 indicates that if a firm utilizes a joint sales channel to promote
its new and remanufactured products, then it should offer higher sales commissions
for both new and remanufactured product sales than it would otherwise offer if it
utilized separate sales channels, regardless of the effectiveness of sales efforts. The
intuition behind this result is as follows. Since the joint channel sales agent is required
to actively promote both new and remanufactured products in the same market,
his efforts dedicated towards the two products have competing effects on demand.
Therefore, to mitigate the consequences from potentially lower sales agent effort (and
thus demand), the firm must offer higher commissions for the sales of both new
and remanufactured products compared to those offered to sales agents in separate
channels.
3.5 Extensions
In order to verify the robustness of the key insights from this paper, we first relax
the deterministic demand assumption to determine whether demand uncertainty or
risk aversion alters the sales agent’s compensation structures in §3.5.1. Then, in
§3.5.2, we account for interactions in the costs of effort for a joint channel agent to
simultaneously promote new and remanufactured products.
as demand uncertainty, risk aversion, or cost interactions between new and remanufactured product
sales efforts are involved, the equivalence of profits between sales channel configurations will not
necessarily hold.
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3.5.1 The Effect of Demand Uncertainty and Risk Aversion
Whereas the main analysis considers product pricing and sales agent effort as the only
two factors that contribute towards demand realizations for new and remanufactured
products, a natural extension is to relax this assumption and allow the demands for
new and remanufactured products to additionally include uncertainty. As such, we
assume that there is demand uncertainty in the form of q̂N = qN+εN and q̂R = qR+εR,





correlation ρ, and the sales agents are risk averse with a constant risk aversion factor
r 6. In this case, it is straightforward to show that the compensation offered to the




















separate channels (Pratt, 1964; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). As one would expect,
a positive correlation between the demands for new and remanufactured products
(indicated by the additional term 2ρBNBRσNσR in the joint channel agent’s utility)
effectively means that the joint channel agent is additionally burdened, whereas a
negative correlation would benefit the agent’s utility due to the substitution effects
in product demand uncertainties.
An analytical investigation of the influence of demand uncertainty and risk aver-
sion on the optimal product portfolio, firm profits, or agent compensation schemes
is very tedious due to the additional number of parameters involved (σN , σR, ρ, and
r). Therefore, we revert to numerical analysis to obtain insights. We start with a
baseline case, where we set σN = 0.5, σR = 0.5, ρ = 0, and r = 1, and consider a
broader range for each parameter in all scenarios considered in §4 to highlight the
robustness of our sales commission related results under demand uncertainty. For δ
6In the agency literature, this approach is commonly referred to as the LEN (linear contract,
exponential utility, and normal errors) framework.
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and cN , we focus on a specific range (δ ≥ 0.75 and cN ≥ 0.75) such that remanufac-
turing is optimal7. Figure 3.7 shows the effects of σN , σR, and r on BN
∗ and BR
∗ for
the joint and separate sales channels, while Figure 3.8a shows the impact of ρ on the
joint sales channel.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8a illustrate the robustness of our results under demand uncer-
tainty and risk aversion. First, we observe that BN
∗ > BR
∗ for product independent
and product dependent sales efforts under joint and separate sales channel configu-
rations, i.e., the insights from Corollaries 3.1, 3.2, 3.5, and 3.6 continue to hold when
demand is uncertain. Second, BN
∗|γR=1 > BN ∗|γR=δ and BR∗|γR=1 > BR∗|γR=δ, i.e.,
the insights from Corollaries 3.4 and 3.7 also continue to hold. Third, BN
∗|{separate} <
BN
∗|{joint} and BR∗|{separate} < BR∗|{joint}, implying that the result from Corollary
3.8 also holds. Finally, in both Figures 3.7 and 3.8a, BN
∗ and BR
∗ are decreasing
in σN , σR, ρ, and r, indicating that an increase in uncertainty, correlation between
demand uncertainties, or risk aversion reduces the sales commissions for new and
remanufactured products. This, in turn, implies that increased uncertainty requires
a higher fixed wage for both sales agents due to the IR constraint on the sales agents,
which is consistent with Basu et al. (1985).
3.5.2 Sales Effort Cost Interactions
So far we have assumed that the costs of effort for new and remanufactured product
sales are independent, i.e., given any effort level choice pair (tN , tR) the total cost of






. This however, may not
necessarily be the case as there may be some dependency between the costs of effort







where a positive µ (i.e., reinforcing efforts) would imply a lower total cost of effort
7Figures 3.7 and 3.8 focus on δ = 0.75 and cN = 0.75 for ease of illustration, but similar patterns
are observed in the broader range of parameters.
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Joint Channel Separate Channels
δ = 0.75, cN = 0.75
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(b) The Impact of µ
Figure 3.8: The Impacts of ρ and µ on Commissions BN
∗ and BR
∗.
and a negative µ (i.e., undermining efforts) would imply a higher total cost of effort.
We investigate the impact of such an interaction term next.
Figure 3.8b illustrates BN and BR as a function of µ for product dependent and
product independent sales efforts in a joint channel setting8, and shows that the
findings from Corollaries 3.5 and 3.6 are preserved: BN
∗ > BR
∗ in the presence of
a cost of effort interaction term. In other words, irrespective of the value of µ, the
firm will find it optimal to always incentivize the sales of new products more than
remanufactured products. This interaction term will also have an impact on the firm’s
remanufacturing decision. Intuitively, firm profits will be increasing in µ, which is a
direct result of the positive synergy in selling efforts between new and remanufactured
products. As µ increases, the firm will find it optimal to remanufacture for even lower
8To avoid boundary effects, µ is assumed to be in [−1/2, 1/2]. Note that the joint channel sales
agent’s utility is jointly concave in tN and tR if −1 < µ < 1. When µ ≥ 1, the agent’s utility would
be unbounded in effort, and when µ ≤ −1, the agent would never exert effort for both products
simultaneously.
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values of δ and cN .
3.6 Conclusions
Our objective in this paper is to provide guidance on sales force management practices
to firms that engage in remanufacturing. We show that profitable remanufacturing re-
quires not only managing the demand for new and remanufactured products through
pricing and market segmentation, but also providing the right incentives for a sales
force. We provide a number of insights for managers of firms selling new and reman-
ufactured products to improve the performance of their sales force. The key insights
are as follows.
First, managing sales force incentives in the presence of remanufactured products
can be contrary to common intuition. A remanufactured product is not an ordinary
product line extension, and hence the associated sales force incentives should be
managed carefully. Even when remanufactured products can provide higher profit
margins and per unit profits than new products, one needs to consider the supply
and demand interaction between the two. With remanufacturing, the impact of the
sales force is driven not only by the relative profit margins or demand uncertainty,
but also by the supply constraints. Because of this dependency, our results indicate
that a remanufacturing firm should offer higher commissions for the sales of new
products than for remanufactured products and this insight holds irrespective of the
channel setting (i.e., joint versus separate channels), sales force effectiveness (product
dependent or product independent), or demand uncertainty. The practical implication
of this result is that salespeople in product recovery divisions of firms should be
paid lower commissions than those in the new product marketing divisions, with the
understanding that the main driver of this differentiation is not the profit margins they
provide, but rather the inherent supply dependence on new product sales. Without
new product sales there can be no remanufactured product to sell, so the policies
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to maximize the revenue from the higher margin remanufactured products become
irrelevant.
Second, our comparison between joint and separate channel configurations for new
and remanufactured products reveals that the structure of sales force compensations
should differ significantly between channel configurations. Essentially, the responsi-
bility to actively promote both new and remanufactured products in the same channel
decreases the effort dedicated towards each product to increase their sales. In other
words, for a given commission level, the sales force in a joint channel internalizes the
substitution between efforts for new and remanufactured products and exerts lower
effort than the same in a separate channel setting. This, in turn, implies that a joint
channel requires higher per unit sales commissions to achieve the same level of sales
as in a separate channel. Nevertheless, the fixed wages in these channel configura-
tions can be adjusted such that the total amount of time dedicated to sales activities
for both products is the same for both channel configurations, resulting in identical
pricing policies and firm profits for joint and separate sales channels. In sum, a joint
channel configuration should provide higher (lower) commissions (fixed wages) for
both new and remanufactured products than a separate channel configuration. This
implies that remanufacturing firms should tailor their sales force compensation prac-
tices to the channel configuration they prefer. In practice, for instance, this implies
that a firm like Bosch, who uses different channel configurations for sales of differ-
ent remanufactured product categories, should use different commission structures in
compensating sales force activities in those categories.
Third, our analysis shows that seemingly profitable remanufacturing opportuni-
ties may not be optimal for a firm to pursue when a firm hires a sales force, whose
costs can reduce the profitability of remanufacturing. In other words, the cost ef-
fectiveness of closed-loop manufacturing activities (such as remanufacturing) may
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not be sufficient to justify their profitability. Understanding the supply dynamics be-
hind closed-loop processes, and adjusting product pricing and sales force management
practices accordingly, is a key factor in achieving possible economic gains. Without
understanding the effects of supply dynamics and sales force incentives, seemingly
attractive opportunities can undermine profits.
Lastly, our results regarding the impact of sales force effectiveness on the prof-
itability of remanufacturing and sales force commissions allow us to make a practical
conjecture, and identify an important empirical research question that can help firms
considering remanufacturing as a business opportunity. Product dependent sales force
effectiveness appears to be representative of B2C settings, where a salesperson may
have no established relationship with the customer and is focused solely on promoting
a product. On the other hand, product independent sales activities appears to be
representative of B2B settings, which involve relationship development and mainte-
nance, repeated interactions, and a level of trust between the salesperson and cus-
tomer. Given this conjecture, our results imply that remanufacturing in a B2B setting
may be profitable under relatively lower cost efficiency gains from remanufacturing
than in a B2C setting. This may partially explain why remanufacturing practices are
more prevalent for firms engaged in B2B activities (e.g. Xerox and Caterpillar) than
for firms engaged in B2C activities, such as consumer goods manufacturers. This in-
terpretation implies that sales commissions in a B2B remanufacturing setting should
be relatively higher than those in a B2C setting.
Future experimental work testing this conjecture would provide better theoretical
and managerial guidance on remanufacturing strategies for firms, both with respect
to product pricing and sales agent compensation plans. We also believe that the
distinction between product dependent versus product independent sales force effec-
tiveness may be observed between different product categories (e.g., innovative versus
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utilitarian products) even within an industry. The important message to remanufac-
turing firms is that understanding where they lie in this spectrum is an important
question they need to address before undertaking remanufacturing.
We also note that remanufacturing divisions may not always be viewed as profit
centers. We interviewed managers of a major telecommunications company who sug-
gested that a separate remanufacturing division may indeed frequently be forced by
new product divisions to limit the offering of remanufactured products, even when
they could provide very high margins. For such firms, remanufacturing divisions are
often viewed as cost centers, where remanufacturing is a strategy to reduce associated
end-of-life costs. For such firms, the priority in pricing would be given to new-product
marketing division, and the pricing and sales force commissions for remanufactured
products would be determined given the new product channel’s choices. An extension
of our model, omitted for brevity, that represents this setting allows us to show the
robustness of our insights under this alternative view of a remanufacturing division
as well.
Finally, we close by noting that an immediate question that deserves attention in
our setting is the effect of competition in the market for remanufactured products.
Our analysis in this paper focuses on a monopolistic setting where only the intra-firm
channels compete for the sales of new and remanufactured products. Alternatively,
remanufactured products could be sold by a separate company or a separate company
could compete against the firm which sells both new and remanufactured products. It
is important to understand how the presence of such competition affects our results,
which we consider an important area of future research. Additionally, the formulation
of the model in this paper is indicative of the supply constraints faced within the
context of remanufacturing, but the underlying implications of utilizing a sales force
to promote sales of a firm that produces a portfolio of products, yet faces a capacity
constraint on the total production, has not been explored.
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CHAPTER IV
FOCUSED OR FLEXIBLE TARGETS? HOW
ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN INFLUENCES THE
DEFINITION OF SUCCESS FOR STRATEGIC
INITIATIVES
4.1 Introduction and Related Literature
Strategic initiatives represent the force that accelerates an organizational
mass into action, overcoming inertia and resistance to change. Strate-
gic initiatives are collections of finite-duration discretionary projects and
programs, outside the organization’s day-to-day operational activities, that
are designed to help the organization achieve its targeted performance.
– Kaplan and Norton (2008, p.103)
Scholars agree that defining the goals of strategic initiatives is paramount in fa-
cilitating their successful execution (Cooper, 1993). The establishment of target out-
comes for an initiative and the management of its execution are related; yet, the effects
that organizational and operational factors have on the definition of which outcomes
constitute successful completion have received inadequate attention, as noted in the
strategy (Rotemberg & Saloner, 1994), organizational behavior (Hoegl & Gemuenden,
2001), R&D management (Nobelius, 2001; Loch & Tapper, 2002), product develop-
ment (Bhattacharya et al., 1998), project management (Morris & Jamieson, 2004;
Pons, 2008), and engineering (Antonsson & Otto, 1995) literatures.
Defining success for strategic initiatives is far from straightforward, as they are
subject to complex challenges. First, their execution requires input from multiple
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stakeholders with diverse knowledge competencies. The interactions between these
stakeholders often exhibit strong interdependencies with respect to the attainment
of the overarching objective. For example, in product development projects1, the
consumer needs identified by the marketing specialists directly affect the develop-
ment goals of the engineering specialists; yet at the same time, the capabilities of
the engineering specialists impose limitations to the types of products the market-
ing specialists can conceptualize and promote. Said differently, extra effort by one
stakeholder rarely substitutes for the deficiencies from another stakeholder in value
creation. Due to such complementarities, impetus (commitment) from all the stake-
holders becomes a necessity for successful project execution; yet, such commitment
can be neither guaranteed, nor assumed (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990). Stakeholder
interactions are a challenging endeavor to manage (Souder, 1988; Song et al., 1997;
Hoegl et al., 2004; Kretschmer & Puranam, 2008; Kavadias & Kovach, 2010).
Second, not only do the stakeholders need to commit costly effort, but they are re-
quired to do so under considerable uncertainty regarding the eventual success (Loch
& Kavadias, 2011). For example, initiatives may face uncertainty in their market
success, technical feasibility, production readiness, or even the “right” timing, among
other things. These uncertain aspects cannot be completely resolved ex ante and they
weaken the relationship between the efforts committed to the project tasks, and the
respective outcomes. The combination of inherent uncertainty with knowledge spe-
cialization gives rise to information asymmetries between the different stakeholders.
Thus, the horizontal and vertical information asymmetry (between the various spe-
cialists and between the specialists and senior management, respectively) gives rise
to moral hazard issues. Given these challenges, senior management needs to care-
fully craft incentive plans and define what constitutes “success” in order to mitigate
1Projects in this paper describe strategic initiatives. Thus, the terms are used interchangeably
(Project Management Institute, 2000; Kaplan & Norton, 2008).
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risks, manage the information asymmetries, and ensure stakeholder impetus (Hoegl
et al., 2004; Kretschmer & Puranam, 2008). In that regard, the definition of suc-
cessful outcomes from a strategic initiative represents the translation of its strategic
objective into an implementable action (Loch & Kavadias, 2011). The delineation of
such actionable targets constitutes the success criteria for the project outcome: a set
of a few specific key deliverables constitutes a focused definition of success; whereas
a larger dispersion in the set of successful outcomes constitutes a flexible definition.
Thus, focused targets only allow a narrowly specified outcome from an initiative to
be considered successful (i.e., exact on time and on budget completion, with precise
adherence to each and every a priori prescribed performance requirement). Flexible
targets consider a broader set of ranked final outcomes from the initiative as accept-
able (Loch & Bode-Greuel, 2001). Although focused targets concentrate attention
to high value (and potentially high uncertainty) outcomes, they may imply costly
incentives to guarantee impetus. Alternatively, flexibility may allow for less costly
incentives to achieve impetus, but the actual outcomes may be of lower value to the
firm. The literature is far from conclusive about the need for flexible as opposed to
focused targets. Some argue that strategic initiatives require a focused definition of
target outcomes (Cooper, 1993; Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Kaplan & Norton, 2008),
while others claim the merits of a more flexible target establishment (Sobek et al.,
1999; Loch & Bode-Greuel, 2001; Klingebiel & Rammer, 2013). In the prior litera-
ture, Rotemberg and Saloner (1994) consider the closest similar setting to ours. They
develop a model where a specialist is compensated for the delivery of a high value out-
come, with the possibility of additional compensation for the delivery of an outcome
that is of a lower value, when secondary outcomes are allowed. Their model attempts
to rationalize conditions where firms might benefit from narrow business strategies
(strategic pursuit of focused as opposed to more broadly aspiring objectives). The
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goal of this paper is to understand how flexibility in the definition of successful out-
comes for a strategic initiative affects its execution, under different project-specific
and organization-specific contexts.
Our contribution to the literature accounts for two distinct realities. First, we
extend the work of Rotemberg and Saloner (1994), as we recognize that the cross-
functional nature of modern organizations is more suitable for capturing the realities
of implementing strategic initiatives. Therefore, we analyze multi-task initiatives to
capture the stakeholders’ interactions during execution. Second, senior management
has specific objectives in mind when undertaking strategic initiatives, yet these may
fail to deliver their ex ante expectations upon completion. We recognize that this
contingency rarely implies a binary “acceptable” or “unacceptable” outcome for the
firm, or a continuum of monetary rewards often assumed in the literature (McGrath
& Keil, 2007). Strategic initiatives have a set of potential outcomes that can be
prioritized a priori and a key consideration is whether to concentrate on the ex ante
“best” outcome, or to allow (i.e., tolerate) lesser valued outcomes. Therefore, a firm
may have the opportunity (and benefit) to consider the value from a priori secondary
outcomes (Loch & Bode-Greuel, 2001).
Our approach allows us to explore how the organizational design of the firm in-
fluences the execution of these projects. Traditionally, firms managed their func-
tional departments separately. These functional organizational structures involve
functional managers leading groups of functional specialists whose interactions on spe-
cific projects occur across functional boundaries (Wheelwright & Clark, 1992). Func-
tional organizations facilitate task specialization through technical guidance from the
functional managers and intradepartmental knowledge transfer between stakeholders
with the same technical skills. More recently, firms have organized in project-based
organizational structures, where cross-functional experts are brought under a distinct
management structure focused on a particular project and led by a dedicated project
80
manager. These project managers mitigate many of the cross-functional integration
challenges amongst the stakeholders and are held accountable for the project execu-
tion (Clark & Wheelwright, 1992). Project-based organizations trade off functional
skill expertise for the benefits of better stakeholder coordination (Allen, 2001; Harris
& Raviv, 2002).
We develop an agency framework where we account for different organizational
structures and we consider what shall be defined as a successful outcome for a strategic
initiative. We compare a principal–multi-agent model with a multi-task principal–
agent model. The former involves a principal and multiple agents (i.e., functional
experts each responsible for a specialized task) and captures the underlying dynamism
of a functional organization; the latter represents senior management and a single
team responsible for multiple tasks (i.e., a coordinated project team responsible for
multiple tasks) to capture the tight coordination characteristics of a project-based
organization. For both models, we explore how senior management (the principal)
can tailor the target outcomes (the definition of success) to influence stakeholder (the
agents) impetus for the execution of an initiative.
Our analysis suggests that strategy implementation rests critically upon the proper
alignment between the targets set and the organizational structure; such alignment
materializes through a well crafted performance measurement and incentive plan.
This allows us to highlight the dual role of performance metrics: they communicate
the scope of successful outcomes (i.e., what types of project outcomes will be re-
warded), and they enable the organizational impetus (i.e., incentivize the necessary
effort commitment) from the relevant stakeholders. Overall, we show that initiatives
with identical inherent uncertainty and project value might admit entirely different
definitions of what constitutes success, depending on the organizational design. High-
risk initiatives benefit from flexibility in what is considered successful, whereas the
definition of success for low-risk initiatives is contingent on the organizational design;
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flexible targets should be specified in functional organizations, whereas focused tar-
gets should be specified in project-based organizations. Flexible targets provide a
tolerance for failure to the stakeholders and reduce the incentives required to ensure
impetus in functional organizations. Yet, such tolerance for failure encourages shirk-
ing in project-based organizations. Lastly, as the costs of stakeholder effort increase,
flexible definitions of success become dominant in functional organizations, whereas
focused definitions become dominant in project-based organizations. Said differently,
as the costs of effort increase, the definition of success shapes to address the dominant
form of information asymmetry encountered by the different organizational forms.
Project-based organizations suffer from vertical information asymmetry between the
stakeholders and senior management, which is best managed with focused definitions
that alleviate the asymmetry. Functional organizations, however, are additionally
challenged with horizontal information asymmetry (hidden information) between the
stakeholders. These cross-functional coordination challenges are best managed with
flexible definitions, which provide a tolerance for failure that enables the necessary
effort commitment from the stakeholders.
4.2 Model Setup
In order for a firm to successfully execute a strategic initiative, senior management
must credibly communicate the target outcomes (i.e., the results which constitute
“success”) to the organizational stakeholders, and offer them sufficient incentives
to ensure impetus during the execution. We assume that the metrics defined by
senior management and the incentives offered to the stakeholders are enforceable
contracts, and thus the firm must compensate the stakeholders accordingly. In this
section, we outline the relationship between stakeholder effort and value creation,
implementation challenges due to the organizational structure, and how the definition
of success influences the stakeholders’ incentives.
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4.2.1 The Relationship Between Effort and Value
The overall value of an initiative is determined by the value contributions from all the
tasks required to complete the initiative. Specifically, if vi is the contribution from
task i to the value of the project, then the total project value is V = f(~vi), where
~vi = (v1, v2, ..., vn) represents the vector of task value contributions and f : RN → Ω ⊂
R represents a general mapping between the individual contributions and the total
value. Note that the general mapping of f encompasses settings where the initiative
tasks exhibit either complementary or substitutable value contributions to one an-
other in generating total project value (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990). Let Ω be the finite
and compact set of all potential outcome values of V from the set of n tasks required
for the project’s execution. Without loss of generality, we assume that the contribu-
tions vi are binary, i.e., vi ∈ {vH , vL}, where vH (vL) represents a high (low) value
contribution such that vH > vL > 0. The overall value V (~vi) is increasing in vi (i.e.,
V (v1, ..., v
H , ..., vn) > V (v1, ..., v
L, ..., vn)). Furthermore, we define V = max{V ∈ Ω}
as the largest potential outcome of V , and V as the lowest potential outcome of V
that is considered acceptable (i.e., “successful”) by the firm. Our conceptualization
of the total project value shares similarities to an NK fitness landscape (Kauffman,
1993), which has been used to model complex performance values in the extant or-
ganizational behavior, strategic management, and innovation management literature
(Levinthal & Warglien, 1999; Rivkin, 2000; Siggelkow & Rivken, 2005; Lenox et al.,
2007).
To complete each task of the initiative, either some minimal effort ei = L, or
significant effort ei = H can be exerted. Lower effort represents settings where lack
of impetus takes place. Significant effort (ei = H) results in a high valued contribution
(vH) with probability p1; the equivalent probability through minimal effort (ei = L)
is p0. We assume 0 < p0 ≤ 12 and p0 < p1 ≤ 1. Thus, the probability of a high
valued outcome from low effort commitment is never greater than the likelihood
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of a low outcome; and, the probability of a high valued outcome is higher with
high effort commitment than low effort commitment. These assumptions about the
value landscape allow us to capture an essential feature of strategy execution: there
exist distinct, rank-ordered outcomes that depend stochastically on the stakeholders’
efforts.
4.2.2 Organizational Structure
Strategic initiatives take place within organizations with a specific design, i.e., the
hierarchial reporting structure among the different stakeholders. We consider two
archetypical organizational structures to capture key trade-offs related to the exe-
cution of strategic initiatives. On one end, functional organizations rely on func-
tional managers to foster functional expertise, yet are prone to interaction chal-
lenges between the stakeholders from different functions; i.e., hidden information
between stakeholders regarding their true effort commitment to the project. Al-
ternatively, project-based organizations trade-off functional expertise to mitigate the
cross-functional interaction challenges through the use of dedicated project managers,
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Figure 4.1: Organizational Structures
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We conceptualize a functional organization as a setting where the multiple tasks
required for project execution are each the responsibility of a different (functional)
stakeholder, with an associated cost of high effort C(eH) = cf . We assume that low
effort bears minimal cost, i.e., normalized to C(eL) = 0. Project-based organizations,
instead, engage dedicated managers that serve as an explicit coordinating mechanism
between the functional stakeholders that execute the project tasks. These project
managers ensure the project team coordinates their efforts, which cost C(eH) = cp
per task. The technical expertise provided by the functional managers (Hobday,
2000; Galbraith, 2008) and the cross-functional monitoring and coordination costs
incurred by project managers (Tsai, 2002) makes the costs of effort different for
the stakeholders of the two different organizational structures; i.e., 0 < cf < cp
(Allen, 2001; Burgelman, 1983; Kavadias & Kovach, 2010). Functional (Project-
Based) organizational structures are graphically represented in Figure 4.1a (4.1b),
with A and B used to delineate two different technical specializations (e.g., marketing
and engineering) and 1 and 2 used to delineate two different initiatives undertaken
by the firm.
4.2.3 Definition of Success and Stakeholder Incentives
Senior management defines the target outcomes (i.e., subset of potential outcomes
that are considered successful) and the respective incentive scheme to induce the exe-
cution of the initiative. Since Ω represents the set of all possible outcome realizations,
we define ΩN = {V ∈ Ω : V = V } as a narrowly specified subset that represents a
focused definition of success, and ΩB = {V ∈ Ω : V ≥ V } as a broader set that ac-
commodates a flexible definition. Therefore, we define ΩN ⊂ ΩB ⊆ Ω. Through the
incentive scheme, senior management communicates the set of successful outcomes
(ΩN or ΩB). Figure 4.2 illustrates how the stakeholder’s value contributions deter-
mine the landscape of potential outcomes of a strategic initiative (Ω), and how senior
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management can use focused or flexible definitions of success to communicate which













Flexible Definition of Success Focused Definition of Success
Figure 4.2: Defining Target Outcomes
We assume that the stakeholders are risk neutral and paid a fixed wage w for
employment. Beyond this fixed wage, senior management offers a bonus b(V,Ω) to
the stakeholders for the successful completion of the strategic initiative. b(V,Ω) is
dependent on the definition of success and the final project value V ∈ Ω. We con-
sider bonus payments contingent on the successful completion of strategic initiatives
as opposed to ownership equity of the project outcome. This is more consistent
with current management practice and better captures intra-organizational incentive
structures (Mihm, 2010). Additionally, we consider the stakeholders to have limited
liability; i.e., senior management cannot offer negative bonuses should the project’s
outcome not meet the requirements specified. Both functional and project managers
are paid a fixed wage for employment, which are comparable and therefore normalized
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to zero without loss of generality. In exchange for the fixed wage, these middle man-
agers either provide technical (in functional organizations) or project management
(in project-based organizations) expertise. Technical expertise facilitates a lower cost
of effort for stakeholders, whereas project management expertise facilitates coordina-
tion between stakeholders with different technical specializations. In summary, the
combination of the defined target outcomes with the respective incentives achieves
a dual role: they cascade senior management’s vision through the communication of
the initiative’s success criteria, and ensure impetus from the stakeholders that are
required for the execution.
4.2.3.1 Functional Organizational Structure Incentives.
Stakeholder expected utility is denoted with the f superscript in functional orga-
nizations, and determined as E[U fi (ei)] = ψ(ei, ~e-i, b) + w − c(ei), where ψ is the
expected project bonus to the stakeholder based on: her dedicated effort towards
task i, the effort dedicated to all other project tasks by the rest of the stakehold-
ers ~e-i, and the compensation plan offered by the firm b. In functional organiza-
tions, senior management must ensure that each stakeholder will exert high effort
on their task, irrespective of the effort committed by the other stakeholders. Let
E[U fi (ei)] = gi : {H,L} × {1, ..., n} → R where n is the total number of tasks re-
quired for project completion and gi(ei, k) represents the stakeholder’s utility when
she chooses ei ∈ {H,L} and k other stakeholders choose H where k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n−1}.
Firm profits for functional organizations are Πf (b) = V (~vi)−
n∑
i=1
b; i.e., the total value
of the project minus the bonuses paid for each of the n project tasks to the stakehold-








s.t. gi(H, k) ≥ gi(L, k) ∀ {i, k} (4.2f)
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ψ(ei, ~e-i, b) + w − c(ei) ∀ i (4.4f)
Equation (4.1f) states the firm’s profit maximization equation. The challenge
of incentivizing stakeholder commitment in functional organizations is formalized in
(4.2f), which ensures that each stakeholder would be better off if they chose to
exert high effort rather than low effort, irrespective of the other stakeholders’ choices.
This additionally excludes the uninteresting cases where senior management would
prefer any stakeholder to exert low effort (ei = L) for their respective task. Each
stakeholder’s individual rationality constraint is formalized in (4.3f); on expectation,
they will not receive a utility below their reservation utility w0 (outside option for
wages should they elect to not support in the project), which we normalize to the
stakeholder’s current wage w. Therefore, each stakeholder is, at worst, indifferent
between working on this particular strategic initiative and employment elsewhere at
their current wage w. Equation (4.4f) is the incentive compatibility constraint, and
indicates that the stakeholders working on the project will choose their effort level as
to maximize their expected utility.
4.2.3.2 Project-Based Organizational Structure Incentives.
Project-based organizations alleviate the hidden information problems associated
with stakeholder dynamics that are present in functional organizations through the
explicit involvement of project managers. Through the use of team meetings and
communication exchanges, a project manager ensures (as part of her job duties) a
common information context among all the project stakeholders. As such, the utility
for each of the stakeholders in the team can be maximized with full knowledge of
the other stakeholder’s effort allocation decisions. In essence, the project manager
allows the various stakeholders to function as a singular team where the individual
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stakeholders have fully aligned objectives (Groves, 1973). Therefore, senior manage-
ment induces high effort from each of the stakeholders through performance incentives
considering the total utility for all of the stakeholders. The expected utility for all
of the stakeholders (the team) is denoted with the p superscript, and determined as
E[Up(~e)] = ψ(~e, b) +
n∑
i=1
w − c(~e); where ψ is the total expected bonus to the team
based on the effort allocation decision for each of the tasks and ~e is the vector describ-
ing the effort allocation for each of the tasks. In project-based organizations, senior
management must incentivize the team to exert high effort on all of the project tasks
and not some smaller subset thereof.
Let E[Up(~e)] = hi : {H,L} × {1, ..., n} → R where n is the total number of tasks
required for project completion such that hi(ei,m) represents the team’s utility when
the team exerts ei ∈ {H,L} for task i and H for some of the m other tasks where
m ∈ {0, 1, ..., n−1}. Firm profits for project-based organizations are Πp(b) = V (~vi)−b,
which is simply the value of the project minus a bonus paid to project team. Note that
the bonus b serves as compensation for all project tasks i ∈ [1, 2, ..., n]. The senior
manager’s problem in a project-based organization can be formalized as follows:
max
b≥0
Πp(b) = V (~vi)− b (4.1p)













w − c(~e) (4.4p)
Equation (4.1p) states the firm’s profit maximization equation. The condition
guaranteeing high effort allocation for all of the tasks is formalized in (4.2p). The
project team receives a higher utility (in expectation) if they exert high effort on all
of the tasks and not some smaller subset thereof. This constraint is similar to (4.2f)
for functional organizations in 4.2.3.1, which explicitly excludes situations where the
firm would employ a stakeholder responsible for a task on an initiative, yet prefer
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that they not fully commit to the project. The stakeholder’s individual rationality
constraint is formalized in (4.3p); on expectation, they will not receive a utility below
their reservation utility w0, which we normalize to the stakeholder’s current wage
w. Equation (4.4p) is the incentive compatibility constraint, and indicates that the
project team (guided by the project manager) will choose the effort level for each of
the necessary project tasks in such a way as to maximize the team’s total expected
utility.
4.2.4 Decision Sequence
For a given organizational structure, senior management must first determine if any
potential value V in the value landscape Ω of the project is sufficient to incentivize
the stakeholders to commit to the initiative. Next, the bonuses b are determined for
each potential outcome of the project V ∈ Ω and communicated to the stakeholders.
This defines the set of successful outcomes (ΩN or ΩB) and conveys the objectives of
the strategic initiative to the stakeholders. Then, the stakeholders determine the level
of effort they wish to exert on the project tasks. We consider the effort allocation
decisions for each task to occur simultaneously. This can be equally interpreted as
decisions occurring sequentially, without any information about them being verified
during the process (i.e. imperfect or hidden information in a sequential game) unless
a project manager is employed to coordinate the efforts2 (Van den Steen, 2012).
Once the project is completed, the final project value V (~vi) is realized. If the
project is considered successful (per the initial definition of success), the firm com-
pensates the stakeholders accordingly. If V 6∈ Ωj for j ∈ {N,B} then the project
is viewed as a failure by the firm (and stakeholders). It is assumed that all of the
2This structure allows us to capture the fact that in functional organizations, it is difficult,
if not impossible, for stakeholders to verify the effort allocation decisions from other stakeholders.
Dedicated project managers represent a credible mechanism for such cross effort validation in project-
based organizations.
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potential project values V ∈ Ω are common knowledge a priori.
4.3 Model Analysis
In our analysis, we consider initiatives that require two distinct tasks for completion
(n = 2). This implies that a single project executed in a firm involves two stakehold-
ers, each responsible for one of the two tasks. Then, either H or L effort must be
exerted towards the two project tasks by each of the stakeholders, with stochastically
resulting contributions vH or vL for each.
We specify Ω = {f(vH , vH), f(vH , vL), f(vL, vH), f(vL, vL)}, where f(vH , vH) >
f(vH , vL) = f(vL, vH) > f(vL, vL). To simplify notation, we define f(vH , vH) =
fh, f(v
H , vL) = f(vL, vH) = fl, and f(v
L, vL) = fx. The bonuses offered to the
stakeholders are defined as ~b = {bh, bl, bx}, respectively. Additionally, ~b is dependent
on both the organizational structure of the firm and definition of success. We define
V = fl, such that fx outcomes are never acceptable to the firm. Further, we define
a focused definition of success as only allowing a project outcome V = fh, such that
fh is the only element in ΩN . Lastly, we define a flexible definition of success as
ΩB = {fh, fl}, such that fl outcomes are additionally considered successful.
We focus our analysis on the definition of success for strategic initiatives under
different organizational settings, and therefore we assume away confounding idiosyn-
cratic effects from stakeholders or tasks. Therefore, we assume that the stakeholders
have symmetric capabilities in task execution and each task poses comparable chal-
lenges; thus, the only differences between the costs of effort (cf and cp) stem from
the organizational structure. Finally, we assume that senior management cannot
distinguish the effective contributions from each task; therefore they cannot differen-
tiate compensation amongst the stakeholders. Thus, in the event that V (~vi) < V ,
senior management cannot determine which tasks contributed vL instead of vH to
V (~vi), and therefore they must pay the same bonus to all of the project stakeholders
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(Jones, 1984). Still, senior management can offer differentiated bonuses b(V,Ω) for
each specific outcome value V (~vi) ∈ Ω.
We define a measure for each stakeholder’s certainty of contributing high value
towards the initiative outcome by considering the marginal benefit from high effort.
Definition 4.1. A Measure of Uncertainty
The marginal benefit from high effort p1 − p0 = ∆ is a measure of the certainty
that high effort yields a valuable project contribution. 
From this definition of ∆, projects with a lower ∆ exhibit more uncertainty than
those with a higher ∆. Said differently, the projects of higher uncertainty are charac-
terized by a lower ∆ and exhibit a larger disconnect between effort and outcome. As
p0 decreases, then a lack of effort is more likely to not contribute value to the project;
whereas when p1 increases, then effort commitment is more likely to contribute value.
Since ∆ increases whenever p0 decreases or p1 increases, the overall certainty that
stakeholder effort will result in a high value contribution is increasing in ∆.
First we investigate firms with functional organizational structures. This is rep-
resented as a multi-agent problem where each agent performs a singular task. Then,
we follow with the analysis of project-based organizational structures. We represent
these project teams as a single agent with multiple tasks. Last, we compare the op-
timal definitions of success (target outcomes) and the associated incentive plans that
achieve stakeholder impetus.
4.3.1 Functional Organizational Structures
Definition 4.2 describes the general structure of the incentive plan for functional or-
ganizations given both focused and flexible definitions of success, which communicate
the project outcomes that are considered acceptable to the firm3.
3For notational clarity in the remaining analysis, we use X|Y to describe X given the condition
Y . For example, ~b|ΩN means the vector of bonuses ~b given a focused definition of success, V ∈ ΩN .
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Definition 4.2. Communicating Target Outcomes in Functional Organi-
zations
fx 6∈ {ΩN ,ΩB} and fl 6∈ ΩN , therefore:
~b|ΩN = {bh ≥ cf , bl = 0, bx = 0} and ~b|ΩB = {bh ≥ cf , bl ≥ cf , bx = 0}.
Definition 4.2 indicates that since fx outcomes are never acceptable to the firm,
bx = 0 for both focused and flexible definitions of success (i.e., no bonus is paid to
the stakeholders for an fx outcome). Additionally, since fh outcomes are acceptable
for both focused and flexible definitions, bh ≥ cf . Lastly, since fl outcomes are
only acceptable for flexible definitions, we have bl ≥ cf when flexible definitions
are specified, but bl = 0 for focused definitions. Definition 4.2 elucidates how the
firm uses performance incentives to communicate the objectives of an initiative to
the stakeholders. Given this framework, we can now identify the optimal incentive
structure offered to the stakeholders, given either a focused or flexible definition of
success.
Proposition 4.1. Functional Organization Incentive Structure
In functional organizations, the optimal incentive structure depends on the rela-
tionship between ∆ and p0, as follows:
If ∆ > p0: ~b|ΩN = {bh =
cf
p0∆






, bx = 0}.
If ∆ ≤ p0: ~b|ΩN = {bh =
cf
p0∆






cf , bx = 0}.
With a focused definition of success in functional organizations, senior manage-
ment offers a bonus bh =
cf
p0∆
to maximize firm profits (Πf |ΩN = fh − 2bh) when
the highest potential outcome is realized, and offers no bonuses for all other out-
come realizations. As expected, the bonus offered for V = fh outcomes increases
in uncertainty with a focused definition of success; i.e., ∂bh
∂∆
< 0. With a flexible




E[Πf ]|ΩB = p12(fh − 2bh) + 2p1(1− p1)(fl − 2bl)
)
depends on the rela-
tionship between ∆ and p0. If ∆ > p0, then project uncertainty is low compared to







, and bx = 0. Alternatively, if ∆ ≤ p0, then project uncertainty
is high compared to the likelihood of task success from low effort. For these more
uncertain projects, senior management offers high powered incentives for V = fh out-
comes and low powered incentives for V = fl outcomes. Specifically, for these more





, bl = cf , and bx = 0.
It is important to note that for high uncertainty projects, a flexible definition of
success shapes the respective incentive structure to exhibit two interesting proper-
ties: (i) the spread between bonuses for V = fh and V = fl outcomes is larger for
high uncertainty projects than for low uncertainty projects (bh|∆≤p0 > bh|∆>p0 and
bl|∆≤p0 < bl|∆>p0), and (ii) the bonuses offered for V = fl outcomes are independent
of the uncertainty (bl|∆≤p0 = cf ). This means that if a certain threshold for project
uncertainty is exceeded (∆ ≤ p0), then the firm benefits from an incentive structure
that increases the bonuses offered for the a priori best outcome, but decreases the
bonuses offered for the a priori secondary outcomes. In other words, the firm re-
wards a secondary outcome, but only as a means to guarantee stakeholder impetus
in the hopes that the best outcome is realized. Thus, secondary outcomes offer an
“insurance” mechanism to the stakeholders, so that they will bear the risk and exert
effort to achieve the best outcome. Our finding bears managerial significance as it
offers intuition regarding the value of an approach that tolerates secondary outcomes,
which under certain circumstances might be viewed as failure; i.e., when a focused
definition of success is used. In our setting, a flexible definition of success captures
such a tolerance for failure. We show that under certain settings (cross-functional
teams in functional organizations), tolerance for failure might be the most beneficial
avenue to pursue risky strategic initiatives. Manso (2011) identifies conditions that
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render tolerance for failure beneficial when structuring multi-period incentives for a
single stakeholder. Our analysis finds benefits when structuring the incentives for
multiple stakeholders for a single period.
We further compare the incentives associated with focused and flexible definitions
of success to determine which initiatives can be pursued in functional organizations.
Definition 4.3. The Set of Feasible Initiatives for Functional Organi-
zations
There exist cost of effort thresholds cf (fh,∆, p0) and cf (fh,∆, p0) such that for
all cf < cf : (fh − 2bh)|ΩN > 0 and for all cf < cf : (fh − 2bh)|ΩB > 0. Let
af (cf ; fl, fh,∆, p0) represent a potential initiative for a functional organization and
F be the finite and compact set of all of the potential initiatives. Therefore, FN =
{af ∈ F : cf ≤ cf} and FB = {af ∈ F : cf ≤ cf} represent the sets of all initiatives
that can be pursued with focused or flexible definitions of success, respectively. 
The set of feasible initiatives allows us to capture an additional metric for strategy
execution. In addition to managing the success (profits) from each initiative, it is
often important from a strategic viewpoint that senior management has the ability
to pursue a wide range of initiatives; i.e., a broad portfolio of potential initiatives.
Definition 4.3 outlines the conditions for which initiatives can be profitably pursued
by a functional organization with focused and flexible target outcomes.
Proposition 4.2. The Definition of Success and the Set of Feasible Ini-
tiatives
For a functional organization, the set of feasible initiatives are ordered as follows:
FN ⊂ FB ⊂ F.
Proposition 4.2 indicates that functional organizations can pursue more initia-
tives through a flexible definition of success than a focused definition, which results
from the higher bonuses for V = fh outcomes associated with focused definitions
95
(bh|ΩN > bh|ΩB). When the stakeholders’ costs of effort are low (cf < cf ), initia-
tives can be pursued with either focused or flexible definitions of success. When
cf < cf < cf , stakeholders’ costs of effort are sufficiently high such that focused
definitions of success cannot be profitably pursued since the bonus offered exceeds
the project value; whereas, when cf > cf , the stakeholders’ costs of effort are so
high that neither focused nor flexible definitions of success can be specified to ensure
stakeholder impetus and guarantee profitable returns. Since riskier (i.e., more rad-
ical) initiatives tend to be of higher cost, Proposition 4.2 indicates that in addition
to allowing the pursuit of more initiatives, flexible definitions also allow senior man-
agement to pursue more challenging initiatives; i.e, “long shot” projects with higher
risks or costlier efforts. Managerially, this implies that in functional organizations,
a culture of focused definitions of success may unintentionally limit the types of ini-
tiatives a firm can profitably pursue. Said differently, senior management’s effort to
focus stakeholder attention to the best possible outcome may “backfire”, and lead to
a total lack of impetus for some initiatives.
Since flexible definitions allow a priori lower valued V = fl project outcomes to
be considered as successful, the overall firm expected profits need to be compared
between focused and flexible definitions of success.
Proposition 4.3. The Definition of Success in Functional Organizations
A focused definition of success is optimal (E[Πf ]|ΩN > E[Πf ]|ΩB) if and only if:
flp0(1−p0−∆)
p0−∆ < cf <
1
2
fhp0∆ and ∆ < p0.
Proposition 4.3 outlines conditions that describe when it is more beneficial to em-
ploy a focused definition of success than a flexible one in functional organizations.
While neither focused nor flexible definitions of success are universally optimal, flex-
ible definitions are more profitable under a wider range of conditions. When the cost
of stakeholder effort is relatively low (cf <
flp0(1−p1)
p0−∆ ) and the uncertainty relatively
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high (∆ < p0), then focused definitions required increased incentives, which get fur-




fhp0∆) and uncertainty is high (∆ < p0), then the costs to incentivize
stakeholder impetus becomes prohibitively high to undertake the initiative. Finally,
when uncertainty is low (∆ > p0), the profit from an initiative with a focused defini-
tion of success never dominates the expected profits from the same initiative with a
flexible definition.
The analysis points out that the stakeholder interactions in functional organiza-
tions give rise to significant indirect costs. These interactions require sizeable in-
centives to ensure impetus with focused definitions of success; the presence of hid-
den information regarding the other stakeholders’ effort commitment contributes to
the increased incentives. In contrast, flexible definitions alleviate the stakeholders’
consequences from hidden information. Therefore, even when there is considerable
certainty that stakeholder efforts contribute value to an initiative, the indirect costs
associated with the stakeholder’s strategic interactions may render a project less prof-
itable with a focused definition of success. Flexible definitions allow the potential for
lower incentives to induce impetus, which may result in higher firm profits, despite
the lower value of secondary project outcomes that may be admitted.
Figure 4.3 shows when focused or flexible target outcomes are preferred under func-
tional organizational structures, contingent on the measure of project uncertainty in
the x axis (∆), and the measure of the proportional value from secondary outcomes in
the y axis ( fl
fh
). Recall that lower values of ∆ indicate higher uncertainty. Eventually,
the high powered incentives required to guarantee impetus from stakeholders who
strategically interact lead to limited conditions where focused definitions of success
are beneficial. Specifically, focused definitions of success are only preferred if there
is moderate uncertainty and the value of fl outcomes is significantly less than that



























(cf = 0.04, p0 = 0.4)
Figure 4.3: Functional Organizational Structure
value scenarios in the landscape.
Corollary 4.1. Definitions of Success Under Additive Value Contribu-
tions
In functional organizations, focused definitions of success are never optimal when
the stakeholders’ contributions to project value are additive.
Corollary 4.1 states an interesting conclusion based on the findings from Propo-
sition 4.3. If the stakeholder contributions to the total project value are additive (a








(see Appendix for the formal claim). Under this range of the a priori secondary
project outcomes (V = fl), focused definitions of success are never optimal. There-
fore, the definition of success for initiatives with additive value contributions benefit
from flexibility.
Proposition 4.4. Cost Implications in Functional Organizations
Let F (cf ,∆,
fl
fh






















Proposition 4.4 formally indicates that as the cost of effort in functional orga-
nizations increases, the conditions in which focused definitions of success are most
beneficial become more constrained. In addition, as expected, more initiatives are




tween the regions where incentives are too costly, and where flexible definitions are
optimal, is shifted upwards and to the right. Additionally, the range of conditions
that render focused definitions of success optimal decreases, as the partition between
the regions where flexible or focused definitions are optimal from Figure 4.3 is shifted
upwards and to the right (defined by G(cf ,∆,
fl
fh
)); still bound from the right by
∆ < p0. The shifts in partitions between these regions as the cost of effort increases
are illustrated by the cf
+ arrows in Figure 4.3. Proposition 4.4 highlights the fact
that as costs increase, flexible definitions of success become more preferred to focused
definitions in functional organizations.
4.3.2 Project-Based Organizational Structures
In project-based organizations, project managers are able to coordinate the various
stakeholders’ actions such that they function as a singular team. Therefore, project
managers are able to alleviate the horizontal hidden information problem amongst
the stakeholders. However, information asymmetry still exists vertically between
the team and senior management. Senior managers must incentivize the team to
exert high effort for each of the project tasks and not some smaller subset thereof.
Definition 4.4 describes the general properties of the incentive plan for project-based
organizations considering both focused and flexible definitions of success.
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Definition 4.4. Communicating Target Outcomes in Project-Based Or-
ganizations
fx 6∈ {ΩN ,ΩB} and fl 6∈ ΩN therefore
~b|ΩN = {bh ≥ 2cp, bl = 0, bx = 0}, ~b|ΩB = {bh ≥ 2cp, bl ≥ cp, bx = 0}.
Definition 4.4 echoes Definition 4.1 and indicates that no bonus should be paid for
fx project outcomes, (i.e., bx = 0 if V = fx, as these outcomes are never acceptable
to the firm). The compensation bh for fh outcomes serves to compensate the team for
both project tasks, for both focused and flexible definitions of success. Lastly, since
fl outcomes are only acceptable for flexible definitions, we have bl ≥ cp when flexible
definitions are specified but bl = 0 for focused definitions. Given this framework, we
can now identify the optimal incentive structure offered to the team in project-based
organizational structures, given either a focused or flexible definition of success.
Proposition 4.5. Project-Based Organization Incentive Structure
In project-based organizations, the optimal incentive structure is:
~b|ΩN = {bh =
2cp
∆(2p0+∆)




cp, bx = 0}.
With a focused definition of success, senior management in project-based organiza-
tions offers a bonus bh =
2cp
∆(2p0+∆)
to maximize firm profits (Πp|ΩN = fh−bh) when the
highest potential outcome is realized. They offer no bonus for all other outcome real-
izations. As expected, ∂bh
∂∆
< 0, indicating that the bonus offered for V = fh outcomes
increases in uncertainty with focused definitions of success. With a flexible target out-
come, the incentive plan ~b|ΩB = {bh =
2cp(1+∆(2p0+∆−1))
∆(2p0+∆)
, bl = cp, bx = 0} maximizes
expected firm profits in equilibrium (E[Πp]|ΩB = p12(fh − bh) + 2p1(1− p1)(fl − bl)).
Unlike the case with functional organizations, there is a singular incentive plan for
flexible definitions of success in project-based organizations. Yet, the bonus offered
for secondary outcomes only covers the cost of effort, a similar result obtained in func-
tional organizations. Thus, senior management accepts these lower valued outcomes
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only as a means to potentially reduce the bonuses associated with V = fh outcomes.
Once more, we see that flexible definitions of success serve as an indication from
senior management of a relatively tolerant for failure organizational environment.
We further compare the incentives associated with focused and flexible definitions
of success to determine which initiatives can be pursued in project-based organiza-
tions.
Definition 4.5. The Set of Feasible Initiatives for Project-Based Or-
ganizations
There exist cost of effort thresholds cp(fh,∆, p0) and cp(fh,∆, p0) such that for all
cp < cp: (fh−2bh)|ΩN > 0 and for all cp < cp: (fh−2bh)|ΩB > 0. Let ap(cp; fl, fh,∆, p0)
represent a potential initiative for a project-based organization and P be the finite and
compact set of all of the potential initiatives. Therefore, PN = {ap ∈ P : cp ≤ cp}
and PB = {ap ∈ P : cp ≤ cp} represent the sets of all potential initiatives that can be
pursued with a focused or flexible definition of success, respectively.
Definition 4.5 defines the conditions for which initiatives can be profitably pursued
by a project-based organization with focused and flexible target outcomes.
Proposition 4.6. The Definition of Success and the Set of Feasible Ini-
tiatives
For a project-based organization, the set of feasible initiatives are ordered as fol-
lows:
if p0 < 1− p1 then PN ⊂ PB ⊂ P; else, if p0 ≥ 1− p1 then PB ⊂ PN ⊂ P.
Proposition 4.6 for project-based organizational structures conveys an important
insight when accounted together with Proposition 4.2. Specifically, in functional or-
ganizations, focused definitions of success always result in higher bonuses for V = fh
outcomes (bh) compared to flexible definitions; the same is not always true for project-
based organizations. In project-based organizations, whether the bonus bh is higher
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with focused or flexible definitions depends on the relative magnitude between the
likelihoods of a high-value contribution from low effort (p0) and a low-value contri-
bution from high effort (1 − p1). In other words, it depends on the size of the type
I or type II “errors” regarding the outcome from effort; e.g. high contribution from
low effort or low contribution from high effort. When the likelihood of a low-value
contribution from high effort dominates that of a high-value contribution from low
effort (p0 < 1− p1), the sets of feasible initiatives are ordered like those in functional
organizations; as the costs of effort increase, more initiatives can be undertaken with
flexible definitions of success than with focused definitions. However, when the likeli-
hood of a high-value contribution from low effort dominates (p0 ≥ 1− p1), the order
reverses. This is because the bonuses required to ensure impetus with flexible defi-
nitions of success exceed those required with focused definitions. Interestingly, this
relationship (p0 ≥ 1 − p1) is strengthened as either p0 or p1 increase, indicating a
higher likelihood that a high value contribution will be achieved from either low or
high effort. Therefore, as the probability of a high outcome increases, flexible defini-
tions of success result in higher bonuses and a smaller set of feasible initiatives than
focused ones. Thus, the possibility of some compensation for V = fl outcomes makes
it more difficult to induce effort commitment on all of the tasks. In order to provide
enough incentive to induce effort on all of the project tasks, the bonus for V = fh out-
comes must be increased beyond the levels offered by senior management for focused
definitions. This observation uncovers a very fundamental difference in the role of
flexible (or more tolerant for lower outcomes) definitions. Flexible definitions of suc-
cess communicate some tolerance for failure in functional organizations, which results
in an overall increase in firm profits; yet, the same is not obvious for project-based
organizations. Such tolerance may encourage intentional under-investment in effort
(shirking), as the team “hedges” their effort allocation due to the high likelihood of a
valuable contribution from low efforts, which results in increased incentives to achieve
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impetus on all of the project tasks.
Next, we compare the overall firm expected profits between focused and flexible
definitions of success. We identify conditions when each definition might be ex ante
more profitable for the firm.
Proposition 4.7. The Definition of Success in Project-Based Organiza-
tions
A focused definition of success is optimal (E[Πp]|ΩN > E[Πp]|ΩB) if and only if:
fl
p0
(1− p0 −∆)(2p0 + ∆) < cp < 12fh∆(2p0 + ∆).
Proposition 4.7 states the conditions for when focused definitions of success are
more beneficial than flexible definitions in project-based organizations. When the







, then the incentives re-
quired to guarantee impetus on both tasks are too costly with narrowly defined, fo-





(1− p0 −∆)(2p0 + ∆)
)
,
the expected profits with a flexible definition of success are higher than with a focused
definition, even though lower valued outcomes (fl) are considered acceptable. When
costs are low, the incentives required to ensure stakeholder impetus are relatively
lower as well; therefore, the additional costs associated with flexible target outcomes
are mitigated by the additional revenue from lower value outcomes. Figure 4.4 indi-
cates when focused or flexible definitions of success are preferred with project-based
organizational structures, with ∆ for the x axis, and fl
fh
∈ (0, 1) for the y axis.
As shown in Figure 4.4 for project-based organizations, high uncertainty (low
∆) makes it too costly to incentivize initiatives and guarantee impetus. Unlike the
result for functional organizational structures, with low uncertainty (high ∆), focused
definitions of success are more beneficial. When uncertainty is low, the incentives
required to guarantee impetus on both project tasks with focused definitions are
sufficiently low such that secondary project outcomes (fl) from flexible definitions



























(cp = 0.08, p0 = 0.4)
Figure 4.4: Project-Based Organizational Structure
are increasing at a faster rate with flexible definitions than focused definitions as
uncertainty is reduced, thus making focused definitions of success more beneficial for




. When there is moderate uncertainty,
focused definitions of success are preferred only when the relative value of V = fl
outcomes is low compared to V = fh outcomes.

























Proposition 4.8 formalizes how the relative dominance of flexible and focused
definitions of success are influenced by stakeholder costs. As the cost of effort in
project-based organizations increases, the conditions in which flexible definitions of
success are most beneficial are diminished. As a result, more initiatives are considered
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unprofitable and not undertaken (i.e., X(cp,∆,
fl
fh
) defining the partition between the
regions where incentives are too costly and where flexible definitions are optimal from
Figure 4.4 is shifted upwards and to the right) or, initiatives that are undertaken are




partition between the regions where flexible definitions or focused definitions are op-











as the cost of effort increases
are illustrated by the cp
+ arrows in Figure 4.4. In summary, as the costs of effort and
coordination increase in project-based organizations, the benefits from focused defini-
tions of success dominate those from more broadly defined, flexible target outcomes.
4.3.3 Comparing Organizational Structures
A visual comparison between figures 4.3 and 4.4 indicates that the same initiative
can be undertaken through entirely different definitions of success in different orga-
nizational structures. Said differently, this observation bears significant managerial
attention: the organizational design affects the definition of what constitutes a suc-
cessful outcome for an initiative. More specifically, when uncertainty is low (high
∆), focused definitions of success are more beneficial in project-based organizations,
whereas flexible definitions are more beneficial in functional organizations. Table 1
summarizes the range of target outcomes, contingent on the initiative’s uncertainty
and the relative value of a priori secondary outcomes.
In addition, we compare the expected profits between the different organizational
structures for focused and flexible definitions of success.








then E[Πf ]|ΩN > E[Πp]|ΩN . If
cp
cf
> (1 + α) then E[Πf ]|ΩB >
E[Πp]|ΩB , where α(p1, p0) ∈ [1, 2].
Corollary 4.2 outlines when initiatives are more profitably managed by functional
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or project-based organizations, given the definition of success. With focused defini-
tions of success, functional organizations are preferred if the relative costs of effort be-










> 1 since p1 > p0. This condition can be rewritten in terms of ∆ to better
explain how project uncertainty determines the preferable organizational structure.








initiatives in functional organizations are more profitable than those in project-based
organizations. This implies that there are conditions where functional (project-based)
organizational structures are preferred for strategic initiatives with high (low) uncer-
tainty. This result indicates that when the incentives required to ensure impetus
are explicitly accounted for, then prior theory suggesting the need for organizational
structures with more centralized decision authority (as it is the case with project-
based organizations in our model) may be incomplete in the case of projects with
high uncertainty (Hobday, 2000; Siggelkow & Rivken, 2005). With flexible definitions
of success, initiatives in functional organizations are more profitable than those in
project-based organizations when the relative cost of effort is above a threshold; i.e.,
cp
cf
> (1 + α), where α is a function of p1 and p0 and bound between one and two.
This means that flexible definitions of success are more profitable in functional or-
ganizations than in project-based organizations when the relative costs of effort and
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coordination in project-based organizations are significantly high. In that regard,
Corollary 4.2 formalizes the relative size of the trade-offs between the explicit coor-
dination costs associated with project-based organizations, and the implicit costs as-
sociated with the stakeholder’s strategic interactions in functional organizations (i.e.,
the higher incentives required in functional organizations to mitigate the horizontal
information asymmetry problem between the stakeholders). If the explicit coordina-
tion costs in project-based organizations are sufficiently high (low), then functional
(project-based) organizational structures are preferred.
Corollary 4.3. Costs of Effort in Functional vs. Project-Based Orga-
nizations
As the costs of effort increase, flexible definitions of success become preferred in
functional organizations and focused definitions of success become preferred in project-
based organizations.
Corollary 4.3 combines the results from Propositions 4.4 and 4.8 to relate how
the definition of success is influenced by increasing costs of effort in both functional
and project-based organizations. In functional organizations, the stakeholders are
subjected to a hidden information problem; none of them know whether the others
commit to the project. In this context, senior management’s use of a flexible defini-
tion mitigates these consequences, and induces stakeholders to exert effort through
relatively lower incentives. Then, as the costs of effort increase, the challenges associ-
ated with the hidden information problem become aggravated and the settings where
flexible definitions of success are optimal expand. In project based organizations, the
employment of a project manager mitigates the hidden information problem. Yet,
senior management is still challenged with a moral hazard problem with the stake-
holders. Focused definitions of success clearly explicate a singular goal for the team,
and only offer a bonus for this singular project outcome. Therefore, focused defini-
tions help mitigate the moral hazard problem, whereas flexible definitions can lead to
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situations where stakeholders intentionally under-invest in effort. As the costs of effort
increase, the potential benefits associated with flexible definitions of success diminish
when uncertainty is low, thus expanding the conditions when focused definitions are
preferred for project-based organizations.
4.4 Conclusions
Strategic initiatives that are well defined, but poorly executed, yield limited value.
Their implementation requires both guidance from concept to completion, and suffi-
cient impetus from all the key stakeholders. Yet, both these conditions are difficult,
if not impossible to guarantee for two important reasons: the inherent uncertainty
with respect to how the initiative specific efforts translate into valuable outcomes,
and the strategic behavior that may take place between stakeholders, especially in
the context of cross-functional teams.
The extant literature and practitioners argue that in order to successfully manage
the execution of these strategic initiatives, senior managers can structurally organize
the various stakeholders in different ways (Galbraith, 2008). Two archetypical struc-
tures have dominated the discussion: in one extreme, firms organize as units based
on functional specialization (marketing, engineering, finance, etc..); and at the other,
firms group functional experts from different specialization backgrounds together into
dedicated teams to be managed by experienced project managers. While functional
organizations are typically easier to manage since functional boundaries and hierar-
chies are maintained, each functional group may not collaborate well with the others
on specific initiatives. Alternatively, project managers in project-based organizations
ensure tighter collaboration across functional boundaries, but at the expense of addi-
tional costs; either due to the dedicated resources for collaboration (Loch & Terwiesch,
2007), or the lower productivity in specialization of the stakeholders in project-based
organizations (Hobday, 2000).
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In this paper, we posit that the organizational design is a necessary, but not
independent consideration for the successful implementation of strategic initiatives.
Firms need to diligently account for the alignment between their organizational struc-
ture and the definition of success for their initiatives. Thus, given the organizational
structure of the firm, managers need to craft performance metrics for the engaged
stakeholders that serve two objectives: to communicate the scope of acceptable out-
comes for the project (i.e., what constitutes a “successful” outcome), and enable
organizational impetus towards the execution of the initiative (i.e., the commitment
of effort towards the execution of the objectives). Focused definitions of success ex-
plicate very narrowly defined outcomes, while flexible definitions allow for broader
(albeit ex ante possibly less desirable) outcomes to be considered successful. While
incentive plans can be developed to guarantee stakeholder impetus for either focused
or flexible definitions of success, it is noteworthy that flexibility typically involves
lower costs (incentives) because it allows a priori secondary outcomes to be consid-
ered “successful” by the firm. In essence, a flexible definition of success provides a
measure of insurance against uncertainty and establishes some tolerance for failure
for the stakeholders. A limitation of this tolerance however, is the acceptance of
secondary outcomes, which may deteriorate overall firm profits. Additionally, under
certain conditions in project-based organizations, flexible definitions of success may
encourage shirking, thus requiring higher powered incentives to guarantee impetus.
We find that for low risk initiatives, a broader set of successful outcomes should be
allowed in functional organizations; whereas, a focused definition should be employed
in project-based organizations. The surprising inability of functional organizations
to pursue initiatives with focused definitions of success has organizational roots: the
strategic interactions between the independent, cross-functional stakeholders. These
interactions power the high incentives required to ensure impetus if success is narrowly
defined, which results in higher costs to the firm compared to a broader definition of
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success with the secondary potential outcomes. We find that flexible definitions are
more effective in facilitating the implementation of high-risk strategic initiatives. In
that light, we offer theoretical support to past claims about the detrimental effects
of narrowly defined target outcomes for R&D projects (Loch & Bode-Greuel, 2001).
Moreover, we show that the willingness of senior management to consider flexible
target outcomes allows a firm to expand the potential set of initiatives they can un-
dertake, and to pursue more risky projects, and therefore more ambitious strategies.
Finally, as the costs of effort and coordination in project-based organizations increase,
focused definitions of success become more beneficial under a larger range of project-
specific conditions compared to flexible definitions. Adapting the incentive plans to
the organizational structure is paramount in ensuring stakeholder impetus. An incen-
tive plan developed for one firm may not provide for the successful implementation of




PROOFS FROM CHAPTER III
Proof. Proposition 3.1:
With BN = BR = 0 (thus tN = tR = 0), solving for the customer’s utility
for new and remanufactured products uN = θ − pN and uR = δθ − pR determines
qN = 1 − pN−pR1−δ and qR =
δpN−pR
δ(1−δ) . We will use the x superscript to designate the
problem parameters without a sales force. By substituting qN and qR into equation










∣∣∣∣∣∣∣, we can verify
the firm’s profit is jointly concave in pN and pR. Specifically, − 21−δ < 0 and |H
x| =
4
δ(1−δ) > 0 for all δ and cN . Therefore, H
x is negative definite with respect to pN and
pR, thus jointly concave. However, despite joint concavity in the decision variables,
there is no guarantee that the unconstrained optimal pair pN and pR does not violate
the (RS), (MC), or (NN) constraints, thus the boundary point solutions must also be
considered. Examining the market capacity constraint (MC), we observe qR + qN =
1 − pR
δ
≤ 1 is satisfied for all δ ∈ [0, 1] and pR > 0, therefore this constraint is
always satisfied. Thus, a Lagrangian with the (RS) and (NN) constraints is solved
by analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for equation (3.2), with
λxRS and λ
x
NN as the Lagrange multipliers for the (RS) and (NN) constraints for Π
x.
Specifically:





















The necessary KKT conditions are: 1) ∂L
x
pN
= 0; 2) ∂L
x
pR




1) = 0; 4) λxNN(
pR−δpN
δ(1−δ) ) = 0; 5)
2δpN−pR−δpR
δ(1−δ) − 1 ≤ 0; 6)
pR−δpN
δ(1−δ) ≤ 0; 7) λ
x
RS ≥ 0; and
8) λxNN ≥ 0.
The first four conditions generate four potential solution sets, of which two satisfy
the last four KKT conditions. These potentially optimal solution sets are annotated
as sets Qaz , with the a superscript defining the specific problem being addressed and
the z subscript denoting the optimal policy for which the parameters define. These
two solution sets are mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive for all δ and cN ,
thus optimal. For cN ≥ 1−δ2 , Q
x









, λxNN = 0}, and for cN < 1−δ2 , Q
x
LR = {pN = 1+cN2 , pR =
δ
2
, λxRS = 0, λ
x
NN =
0}. Substitution of the terms in QxFR and QxLR into qN and qR confirms that qR > 0




RS constraint is binding) for QxBR if cN ≥ 1−δ2 .
Proof. Proposition 3.2:
With γR = δ, the demand for new and remanufactured products results in qN =
1 − (pN−pR)−(tN−δtR)
1−δ and qR =
δpN−pR−δ(tN−tR)
δ(1−δ) . The firm’s problem is formalized
below by substituting qN and qR into equation (3.1) as follows, with the (IR) and
(IC) constraints shown for both the new and remanufactured product sales agents
and differentiated by the N and R subscripts, with the {s, δ} superscript denoting
separate sales agents with product dependent sales effort effectiveness (γR = δ):
max
pN ,pR,AN ,AR,BN ,BR
Π{s,δ} = (pN − cN)qN + pRqR− (AN +BNqN)− (AR +BRqR)
s.t. U(tN) = AN +BNqN − 12tN
2 ≥ 0 (IRN)
U(tR) = AR +BRqR − 12tR







qR ≤ qN (RS)
qR + qN ≤ 1 (MC)
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qR ≥ 0 (NN)
First, we will solve the agents’ subproblems by determining tN and tR from the
incentive compatibility (ICN and ICR) constraints. By substituting the values for qN
and qR into U(tN) and U(tR), we have:





















= −1 < 0, the utility for each agent is concave and
thus can be determined through first order conditions. Therefore, we must solve the








1−δ − tR = 0. This results in tN =
BN
1−δ and tR =
BR
1−δ .
Recognizing that the firm only needs to satisfy (not exceed) each agent’s IR con-








2. Substituting terms back into the firm’s optimization problem yields:
max
pN ,pR,AN ,AR,BN ,BR








s.t. qR ≤ qN (RS)
qR + qN ≤ 1 (MC)
qR ≥ 0 (NN)
Substituting tN =
BN
1−δ and tR =
BR






































we can verify the firm’s profit is jointly concave in BN , BR, pN , and pR if 0 < δ <
2
5
. Specifically, the first principal minor − 1
(1−δ)2 < 0 for all δ and cN , the second
principal minor 1




for 0 < δ <
√
2 − 1, while the fourth principal minor |H{s,p}| = 2−5δ
δ(1−δ)6 > 0 for






2− 1, Π{s,δ} is only negative definite (thus jointly concave in
all four decision variables) for 0 < δ < 2
5
. This implies that there is no interior global
maximum for the unconstrained problem if 2
5
< δ < 1. Since we cannot guarantee
that the global maximum when 0 < δ < 2
5
does not violate the (RS), (MC), or (NN)
constraints, the boundary point solutions must also be considered. Therefore, the




MC , and λ
{s,δ}
NN representing the (RS),
(MC), and (NN) constraints for Π{s,δ} from equation (3.1):

















The necessary KKT conditions are: 1) ∂L
{s,δ}
pN
= 0; 2) ∂L
{s,δ}
pR























δ(1−δ) ≤ 0; 10)
(pR−δpN )(1−δ)+δ(BN−BR)
(1−δ)2δ ≤ 0; 11) λ
{s,δ}






The first seven KKT conditions generate seven potential solution sets, of which
three satisfy the last six KKT conditions. These areQ
{s,δ}
FR = {pN =
1+5δ+cN δ−2δ2
1+6δ−δ2 , pR =
δ(1−2cN−5δ+cN δ)
−1−6δ+δ2 , BN =
1−cN+cN δ−δ2











NN = 0} for 3δ−3δ−4 ≤ cN < 1; Q
{s,δ}
LR = {pN =
2(1−2δ−cN δ)
2−5δ , pR =
δ(1−3δ+cN δ)
2−5δ , BN =
(2−2cN−3δ+cN δ)(1−δ)




RS = 0, λ
{s,δ}
MC = 0, λ
{s,δ}
NN = 0} for 0 < δ < 25
and 1
2
≤ cN ≤ 3δ−3δ−4 or
2
5
< δ < 1 and 3δ−3





NR = {pN = 1, pR =
−, BN = 1 − cN , BR = −, λ{s,δ}RS = 0, λ
{s,δ}
MC = 0, λ
{s,δ}
NN = δ(1 − 2cN)} for 0 < cN ≤ 12 .
By examining the Lagrange multipliers, we see that the (RS) constraint is tight for
Q
{s,δ}
FR , the (NN) constraint is tight for Q
{s,δ}
NR , while Q
{s,δ}
LR is unconstrained. Note
that for Q
{s,δ}
NR , since there is no remanufactured product in the market (qR = 0), the
demand for new products is qN = 1− pN + tN .
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LR , and Q
{s,δ}
NR ) are feasible
when 2
5
< δ < 1 and 3δ−3
δ−4 ≤ cN ≤
1
2
, so the profits for each of these scenarios must





































< δ < 1 and
3δ−3
δ−4 ≤ cN ≤
1
2













if cN ≥ δ−5+
√
1+6δ−δ2

















δ−6 . Therefore Q
{s,δ}
FR is optimal if {cN > c1 and δ ≤ δ̈} or {cN > c2
and δ > δ̈}, Q{s,δ}LR is optimal if c3 ≤ cN ≤ c1 and δ ≤ δ̈, while Q
{s,δ}
NR is op-





δ−6 , c3 =
1
2




Using algebra to compare (BN , BR) ∈ Q{s,δ}FR confirms BN =
1−cN+cN δ−δ2
1+6δ−δ2 > BR =
(1−cN+δ)δ(1−δ)
1+6δ−δ2 ∀ (δ, cN) ∈ Ω
{s,δ}





2−5δ > BR =
(2cN−1)δ(1−δ)




For ΩγR=1NR ⊂ Ω
γR=δ




NR gets smaller in δ, we will

































δ−6 }. This partition splits the
range of δ into three parts for analysis, as each has a different set of upper and lower
bounds on cN for the set R(δ, cN). To prove that the set is getting smaller in δ, we will
compare the difference between the upper and lower bounds as δ increases. We will























1−6δ . Now, by taking the derivatives of ∆ with










































Proposition 3.4 involves the firm utilizing a single sales agent (channel) to promote
both new and remanufactured products. Further, we will assume that the sales effort
effectiveness is product dependent (γR = δ). Determining the demand for new and re-
manufactured products results in qN = 1− (pN−pR)−(tN−δtR)1−δ and qR =
δpN−pR−δ(tN−tR)
δ(1−δ) .
First, we will solve the agent’s subproblem by determining tN and tR from the
incentive compatibility (IC) constraint of equation (3.1) for Π{j,δ}, where the super-
script {j, δ} refers to a joint sales channel with γR = δ. By substituting the values
for qN and qR into U(tN , tR), we have:



















∣∣∣∣∣∣∣, we can verify
that the agent’s utility is jointly concave in tN and tR, thus allowing the optimal





1−δ . Note that the effort that the agent exerts towards either product is
dependent on the commissions of both products.





2). By substituting terms back into equation (3.1), relabeling the non-
negativity constraint for qR from (NN) to (NN1), and controlling for the non-
negativity in tN and tR from the (IC) constraint with the (NN2) and (NN3) con-
straints , the firm’s optimization problem is:
max
pN ,pR,A,BN ,BR









s.t. qR ≤ qN (RS)
qR + qN ≤ 1 (MC)
qR ≥ 0 (NN1)
tN ≥ 0 (NN2)
tR ≥ 0 (NN3)
Note that we now have two additional non-negativity constraints, as the agent
must not exert negative effort towards either product. These were not necessary with
separate sales agents (channels) as their efforts were guaranteed positive as long as
the commissions BN and BR are positive.
Substituting tN =
BN−BR
1−δ and tR =
BR−δBN










































we can verify the firm’s profit is jointly concave in BN , BR, pN , and pR if 0 < δ <
2
5
. Specifically, the first principal minor − 1+δ2
(1−δ)2 < 0 for all δ and cN , the second
principal minor 1
(1−δ)4 > 0 for all δ and cN , the third principal minor
δ(2+δ)−1
(1−δ)4 < 0 for
0 < δ <
√
2− 1, while the fourth principal minor |H{j,δ}| = 2−5δ








2 − 1, Π{j,p} is only negative definite (thus jointly concave in all four
decision variables) for 0 < δ < 2
5
. Since there is no interior global maximum for
the unconstrained problem if 2
5
< δ < 1, and we cannot guarantee that the global
maximum when 0 < δ < 2
5
does not violate the (RS), (MC), or (NN) constraints,
the boundary point solutions must also be considered. Therefore, we account for the











NN3; and the following Lagrangian is analyzed:
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= 0 2) ∂L
{j,δ}
pR
= 0 3) ∂L
{j,δ}
BN
= 0 4) ∂L
{j,δ}
BR




















































BN ≤ 0 11) BN + BR−BN1−δ −
pR
δ
≤ 0 12) δ(BN (1+δ)−2BR)−(δpN−pR)(1−δ)




1−δ ≤ 0 15) λ
{j,δ}
RS ≥ 0 16) λ
{j,δ}
MC ≥ 0 17) λ
{j,δ}
NN1 ≥ 0 18) λ
{j,δ}
NN2 ≥ 0 19) λ
{j,δ}
NN3 ≥ 0
The first nine KKT conditions generate 21 potential solution sets, of which four
satisfy the last ten KKT conditions. These are Q
{j,δ}
FR = {pN =
1+5δ+cN δ−2δ2
1+6δ−δ2 , pR =
δ(1−2cN−5δ+cN δ)
−1−6δ+δ2 , BN =
(−1+cN−δ)(1+δ)











NN1 = 0, λ
{j,δ}
NN2 = 0, λ
{j,δ}
NN3 = 0} for cN ≥ 3δ−3δ−4 ; Q
{j,δ}
LR = {pN =
2(1−2δ−cN δ)
2−5δ , pR =
δ(1−3δ+cN δ)
2−5δ , BN =
2−2cN−4δ+3cN δ




RS = 0, λ
{j,δ}





NN2 = 0, λ
{j,δ}
NN3 = 0} for 0 < δ < 25 and
1
2
≤ cN ≤ 3δ−3δ−4 or
2
5
< δ < 1 and
3δ−3










MC = 0, λ
{j,δ}
NN1 = δ(1 − 2cN), λ
{j,δ}
NN2 = 0, λ
{j,δ}
NN3 = 0} for cN ≤ 12 ; and Q
{j,δ}
XX =









RS = 0, λ
{j,δ}









4δ−2 } for cN =
1
2
and δ 6= 1
2
. By examining the Lagrange
multipliers, we see that the (RS) constraint is tight for Q
{j,δ}
FR , the (NN1) constraint
for non-negative remanufactured product demand is tight for Q
{j,δ}
NR , the (NN3) con-





LR is unconstrained. Note that for Q
{j,δ}
NR , since there is no remanufactured
product in the market (qR = 0), the demand for new products is qN = 1− pN + tN .






NR , and Q
{j,δ}
XX ) are fea-
sible in overlapping regions of δ and cN , so the profits for each of these scenarios must















































XX never results in strictly superior profits, and is there-

























for all δ and cN , the result-
ing partition of the optimal parameter set follows identically to that from Proposition
3.2.
Propositions 3.3 and 3.5 are solved in an identical manner to Proposition 3.2 and
are omitted for brevity. Furthermore, Corollaries 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 are
solved in an identical manner to Corollary 3.1 and are also omitted for brevity.
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS FROM CHAPTER IV
We define ψh the expected compensation if both stakeholders exert effort H, ψl if
only one of the two stakeholders exerts effort H, and ψx if neither stakeholder exerts
effort H (both exert a minimal, costless effort L). Therefore:
ψh = p1
2(bh) + 2p1(1− p1)(bl) + (1− p1)2(bx)
ψl = p0p1(bh) + p0(1− p1)(bl) + p1(1− p0)(bl) + (1− p0)(1− p1)(bx)
ψx = p0
2(bh) + 2p0(1− p0)(bl) + (1− p0)2(bx)
Proof. Proposition 4.1: Functional Organization Incentive Structure
Constraint (4.2f) results into two conditions that must be satisfied in order to
avoid a lack of impetus (ei = H) from either of the two stakeholders. Specifically we
require ψh − cf ≥ ψl and ψl − cf ≥ ψx. The first of these two equations implies that
each stakeholder would prefer to exert costly effort towards the project instead of
shirking as long as the other stakeholder exerted effort as well. The second equation
implies that each stakeholder would prefer to exert costly effort even if the other
stakeholder does not. Together, these two conditions imply that each stakeholder
would prefer to exert a costly effort towards the project, irrespective of the actions of
the other stakeholder. Constraint (4.3f) requires that if the stakeholder exerts effort,
their expected utility should at least equal their current wage w: ψh+w−cf ≥ w and
ψl +w− cf ≥ w. Equation (4.4f) indicates that each stakeholder will exert an effort
that will maximize their expected utility, and is satisfied by the constraints posed in
(4.2f); since the agent’s effort choice is binary (4.2f) ensures that the agent would
always prefer to exert high effort.
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With a focused definition of success, the firm will only offer a bonus bh in the event
a V = fh project outcome is achieved, thus maximizing Π
f = fh−2bh is equivalent to
minimizing bh. To ensure stakeholder impetus, bh =
cf
p0∆
is the smallest bonus that
can be offered which satisfies the conditions in Equations (4.2f) and (4.3f). From
Definition 4.2, this results in ~b|ΩN = {bh =
cf
p0∆
, bl = 0, bx = 0}.
With a flexible definition of success, the firm will offer bonuses bh or bl depending
on whether a V = fh or V = fl project outcome is achieved, respectively. Since the
compensation plan is offered by senior management and accepted by the stakeholders
prior to the project outcome realization, senior management must ensure impetus
on all project tasks based on the expected profits to the firm given either V = fh
or V = fl outcomes. Therefore, the firm must determine bh and bl by maximizing
E[Πf ]|ΩB = p12(fh − 2bh) + 2p1(1 − p1)(fl − 2bl), while considering the constraints
posed in (4.2f) and (4.3f): ψh − cf ≥ ψl, ψl − cf ≥ ψx, ψh + w − cf ≥ w and
ψl + w − cf ≥ w.
Three incentive structures satisfy the constraints posed in (4.2f) and (4.3f), and
are noted with superscripts A-C:






, bl = cf , bx = 0}






, bx = 0}
~b|CΩB = {bh = cf , bl =
cf (1 + p1∆)
∆(1− 2p1)
, bx = 0} iff p1 <
1
2













; i.e., ∆ ≤ p0.









Similarly for flexible target outcomes (and keeping the superscript notation out-
lined in Proposition 4.1 to differentiate the incentive plans), when ∆ ≤ p0 then
Vh|AΩB = fh − 4cf − 2cf
(1−∆)
p0∆




algebra it can be shown that Vh|ΩN > 0 when cf < cf , where cf = 12fhp0∆. Addition-
ally: if ∆ ≤ p0 then Vh|AΩB > 0 when cf < cf
A, where cf
A = fhp0∆
2(1−∆+2p0∆) ; whereas, if




fh∆. Further, bh|ΩN > bh|AΩB
when ∆ ≤ p0, and bh|ΩN > bh|BΩB when ∆ > p0. Therefore, it can also be shown that
0 < cf < cf
A when ∆ ≤ p0, and 0 < cf < cfB when ∆ > p0; thus 0 < cf < cf .
Proof. Proposition 4.3: The Definition of Success in Functional Organizations
The total expected firm profits in a functional organization are calculated as:
E[Πf ] = p1
2(fh − 2bh) + 2p1(1 − p1)(fl − 2bl) + (1− p1)2(fx − 2bx). With a focused
definition of success, this yields E[Πf ]|ΩN = p12(fh−
2cf
p0∆
). The expected profits with a
flexible definition depends on the relationship between ∆ and p0, such that: if ∆ ≤ p0
then E[Πf ]|AΩB = p1
2
(
fh − 4cf − 2cf (1−∆)p0∆
)
+2p1(1−p1)(fl−2cf ); and if ∆ > p0 then





+ 2p1(1− p1)(fl − 2cf∆ ). Through algebra, it can be shown
that: if ∆ > p0 then E[Π
f ]|ΩN < E[Πf ]|BΩB ; and if ∆ ≤ p0 then E[Π
f ]|ΩN > E[Πf ]|AΩB
only if cf >
flp0(1−p0−∆)
p0−∆ . If cf > cf =
1
2
fhp0∆ then focused definitions of success are
not profitable in functional organizations (see Proposition 4.2).
Proof. Proposition 4.4: Cost Implications in Functional Organizations
Let F (cf ,∆,
fl
fh
) define the function E[Πf ]|ΩB = 0. Solving for fl that results in
E[Πf ]|ΩB = 0 yields fl =
2cf(−2p20+3p0p1−p21+p1)+fhp0p1(p0−p1)
2p0(p1−1)(p0−p1) . Dividing each side of the




































< 0 whenever E[Πf ]|ΩB ≥ 0 and
∂F
∂fl/fh















) define the function E[Πf ]|ΩB = E[Πf ]|ΩN . Solving for fl while
setting E[Πf ]|ΩB = E[Πf ]|ΩN yields fl =
cf (p1−2p0)
p0(p1−1) . Substituting p1 = p0 +∆, dividing
































Proof. Corollary 4.1: Definition of Success Under Additive Value Contributions
Consider the following two component value function where the two components
are additive and serve as pure substitutes. Let V = f(~vi) = Σvi, where vi = {vH , vL}
such that 0 < vL < vH . Define fh = v
H + vH and fl = v






. Taking the limit of fl
fh
as vL → 0 = 1
2
. Taking the limit of fl
fh
as





Through algebra, it can be shown through the conditions outlined in Proposition







Proof. Proposition 4.5: Project-Based Organization Incentive Structure
Constraint (4.2p) results into two conditions that must be satisfied in order to
avoid a lack of impetus (ei = H) on either of the two tasks. Specifically we require
ψh − 2cp ≥ ψl − cp and ψh − 2cp ≥ ψx. The first of these two equations implies that
the project manager would prefer to ensure costly effort towards both project tasks
instead of only one. The second equation implies that the project manager would
prefer to ensure costly effort on both tasks as opposed to neither. Together, these
two conditions imply that the project manager would prefer to ensure a costly effort
towards both tasks as opposed to some smaller subset thereof. Constraint (4.3p)
requires that if effort is exerted on the tasks, the expected utility should at least
equal their current wage w: ψh + w − 2cp ≥ w. Equation (4.4f) indicates that the
project manager will ensure effort in such a way as to maximize the team’s expected
utility, and is satisfied by the constraints posed in (4.2p).
With a focused definition of success, the firm will only offer a bonus bh in the event
a V = fh project outcome is achieved, thus maximizing Π
p = fh − 2bh is equivalent




bonus that can be offered which satisfies the conditions in Equations (4.2p) and (4.3p).
From Definition 3, this results in ~b|ΩN = {bh =
2cp
∆(2p0 + ∆)
, bl = 0, bx = 0}.
With a flexible definition of success, the firm will offer bonuses bh or bl depending
on whether a V = fh or V = fl project outcome is achieved, respectively. Since the
compensation plan is offered by senior management and accepted by the stakeholders
prior to the project outcome realization, senior management must ensure impetus
on all project tasks based on the expected profits to the firm given either V = fh
or V = fl outcomes. Therefore, the firm must determine bh and bl by maximizing
E[Πp]|ΩB = p12(fh− bh) + 2p1(1−p1)(fl− bl), while considering the constraints posed
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in (2p) and (3p): ψh − 2cp ≥ ψl − cp, ψh − 2cp ≥ ψx, and ψh + w − 2cp ≥ w.
Two incentive structures satisfy the constraints posed in (4.2p) and (4.3p), and
are noted with superscripts D and E:






, bx = 0}
~b|EΩB = {bh =
2cp(1+∆(2p0+∆−1))
∆(2p0+∆)
, bl = cp, bx = 0}
By substituting each incentive structure into E[Πp], we determine that:
E[Πp]|~b|DΩB
< E[Πp]|~b|EΩB
; therefore ~b|DΩB is never optimal. This results in the
optimal incentive plan for a flexible definition of success as ~b|EΩB = ~b|ΩB = {bh =
2cp(1+∆(2p0+∆−1))
∆(2p0+∆)
, bl = cp, bx = 0}.












it can be shown that Vh|ΩN > 0 when cp < cp, where cp = 12fh∆(2p0+∆). Additionally,
Vh|ΩB > 0 when cp < cp, where cp =
fh∆(2p0+∆)
2(1+∆(2p0+∆−1)) . Further, bh|ΩN > bh|ΩB when
p0 + p1 < 1. Therefore, it can also be shown that 0 < cp < cp when p0 + p1 < 1.
Proof. Proposition 4.7: The Definition of Success in Project-Based Organizations
The total expected firm profit in a project-based organization is calculated as:
E[Πp] = p1
2(fh − bh) + 2p1(1− p1)(fl − bl) + (1− p1)2(fx − bx). With focused target
outcomes, this yields E[Πp]|ΩN = p12(fh −
2cp
∆(2p0+∆)
). The expected profits with a
flexible definition of success E[Πp]|ΩB = p12(fh−
2cp(1+∆(2p0+∆−1))
∆(2p0+∆)
) + 2p1(1− p1)(fl −
2cp). Through algebra, it can be shown that E[Π




∆)(2p0 + ∆). If cp > cp =
1
2
fh∆(2p0 + ∆) then focused definitions of success are not
profitable in project-based organizations (see Proposition 4.5).
125




) define the function E[Πp]|ΩB = 0. Setting E[Πp]|ΩB = 0 and





X = (p0 + ∆)
(
p0 + ∆− 2cp(p0+∆+p0∆)fh∆(2p0+∆) + 2
fl
fh
− 2(p0 + ∆) flfh
)
.
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Proof. Corollary 4.2: Functional vs. Project-Based Organization Profits
If a firm employs focused target outcomes, then the expected profits with a func-
tional organization are E[Πf ]|ΩN = p12(fh −
2cf
p0∆












If a firm employs a flexible definition of success, then the expected profits with
a functional organization are dependent of the relationship between ∆ and p0, such
that: if ∆ ≤ p0 then E[Πf ]|AΩB = p1
2
(
fh − 4cf − 2cf (1−∆)p0∆
)
+2p1(1−p1)(fl−2cf ); and
if ∆ > p0 then E[Π





+2p1(1−p1)(fl− 2cf∆ ). With a project-based




2p1(1 − p1)(fl − 2cp). By comparison, when ∆ ≤ p0 then E[Πf ]|ΩB > E[Πp]|ΩB if
cp
cf
> 1 + α1 where α1 =
p30−(1+2p0)p21+p31
p30−p0(1+p0)p1
∈ [1, 2] when ∆ ≤ p0. Similarly, when ∆ > p0
then E[Πf ]|ΩB > E[Πp]|ΩB if
cp
cf
> 1 + α2 where α2 =
p0(2+p0−p1)+p1
(1+p0)p1−p20
∈ [1, 2] if ∆ > p0.
Since α1 ∈ [1, 2] and α2 ∈ [1, 2], for notational convenience we replace both with the
general term α, such that α = α1 if ∆ ≤ p0 and α = α2 if ∆ > p0.
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